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Abstract
Recent changes in structure of the U.S. pork industry reflect, in many ways, past
changes in the broiler industry. Production contracts and vertical integration in the
broiler industry facilitated rapid adoption of new technology, improved quality control,
assured market outlets for broilers, and provided a steady flow of broilers for process-
ing. Affordable, high-quality chicken products have contributed to continual increases
in U.S. chicken consumption, which has surpassed pork and beef on a per capita basis.
Incentives for contracting and vertical integration in the pork industry may yield com-
parable results. If so, these arrangements might be expected to result in larger supplies
of higher quality pork products at economical prices.
Keywords: Vertical coordination, vertical integration, contracts, transaction costs,
technology, chicken, pork.
Acknowledgments
I thank Jim MacDonald and Leland Southard for their extensive comments. I also
received valuable comments from Lee Schrader, Alden Manchester, and Annette
Clauson. Thanks also go to Lindsay Mann and Tom McDonald for editorial assistance,
Wynnice Pointer-Napper for assistance with tables and charts, and Victor Phillips, for
camera copy and cover design.
Note: Use of brand or firm names in this publication does not imply endorsement by
the U.S. Department of Agriculture.
Washington, DC 20036-5831 April 1999iivVertical Coordination in the Pork and Broiler Industries Economic Research Service/USDA
Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .iii
Glossary of Terms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .iv
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1
The Role of Changing Vertical Coordination in the Broiler and Pork Industries  . . . . . . . .2
Growth of the Broiler Industry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2
Recent Developments in Vertical Coordination of the Pork Industry  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .8
Application of Vertical Coordination Theories to the Broiler and Pork Industries . . . . . . .13
Transaction Costs  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .13
Price and Production Risk . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .17
Financing Production Inputs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .19
Costs Associated with Contracting and Integration  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .19
Relationship Between Increased Vertical Coordination,Product Prices,and Quality  . . . .21
Chicken Products  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .21
Pork Products . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .24
Policy Responses to New Methods of Vertical Coordination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .28
Summary and Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .30
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .32
Appendix:Simulations of Retail Broiler Prices Assuming Input Price Increases Are 
Passed on to Consumers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .36
ContentsEconomic Research Service/USDA Vertical Coordination in the Pork and Broiler Industries v iii
Recent changes in the structure of the U.S. pork indus-
try reflect, in many ways, past changes in the broiler
industry. Production contracts and vertical integration
in the broiler industry facilitated rapid adoption of new
technology, improved quality control, assured market
outlets for broilers, and provided a steady flow of
broilers for processing. Affordable, high-quality
chicken products have contributed to continual
increases in U.S. chicken consumption, which has sur-
passed pork and beef on a per capita basis. Incentives
for contracting and vertical integration in the pork
industry may yield comparable results. If so, these
arrangements might lead to larger supplies of higher
quality pork products at economical prices.   
Continual reductions in inflation-adjusted (real)
chicken prices and response to changing consumer
preferences played an important role in the growth of
per capita chicken consumption since the 1940’s. An
increase in the value of households’ time, reduction in
household size, and information linking diet and health
have led to consumer preferences for convenient and
nutritious food products; and the broiler industry has
responded. Broiler products have become more conve-
nient; from New York dressed birds (head, feet, and
entrails intact), to eviscerated whole birds, to cut-up
birds and parts. After World War II, supermarkets
replaced specialty meat markets. Broilers were appeal-
ing to both the supermarkets and consumers because
of their relative ease of handling and preparation. In
addition, because chicken meat was a good value, they
were used as a price item to attract customers.
Expansion of fast food chains also provided an oppor-
tunity to cater to consumer preferences through further
processed products, such as nuggets and patties.
Contracts and vertical integration have helped increase
broiler supplies, reduce chicken prices, and improve
product quality and consistency. Production contracts
between broiler growers and feed suppliers encouraged
rapid adoption of new technology that created
economies of size and lowered production costs.
Control over quality and uniformity, provided through
production contracts and integrated operations, facili-
tated the industry’s response to changing consumer
preferences for quality and convenience-type products. 
Similar structural changes in both the pork and broiler
industries suggest that incentives for the growth in
contracting and vertical integration might be similar as
well. The changing structure of the U.S. pork industry
is also characterized by advances in technology,
economies of size, and gains in production efficiency.
Since 1990, larger supplies have lowered real retail
pork prices. In addition, changing consumer prefer-
ences and ability to control quality attributes through
advances in hog genetics, create incentives for control-
ling the quality of hogs produced.  
Efforts to respond to consumer preferences for quality
and convenience of pork products, in addition to
economies of size, may lead to more rapid increases 
in contracting and integration in the pork industry.
While some progress has been made in improving
pork quality, per capita pork consumption has been
stable over the 1990’s. Contracting and vertical inte-
gration can provide greater control over the quality and
uniformity of hogs that is necessary for responding to
consumer preferences.
Like the broiler industry, the pork industry has seen
periods of depressed prices. Although policymakers
proposed stabilization policies in response to broiler
price depressions in the late 1950’s and early 1960’s,
the industry chose to remain free from government
intervention. At the end of 1998, cash hog prices in the
Midwest fell to levels not seen in 50 years. Unlike the
broiler industry, the hog industry has a large base of
independent producers that make price discrimination
and decline in market outlets highly visible issues.  
SummaryAsset specificity: The degree to which assets serve a
special purpose, with little value outside of their
intended application. 
Asymmetric information: Situation whereby traders
have different information that is important in determin-
ing efficient behavior or in evaluating performance of
the trading partner.  
Bounded rationality: Limitations on the human abil-
ity to foresee all future possibilities when formulating
decision plans. 
Broilers:Young chicken produced for meat instead of
eggs.
Grower: Typically a small producer that provides the
labor and facilities in a resource-providing contract
arrangement.
Industrialization: Term used to describe significant
structural changes in agriculture. It is characterized by
increased levels of capital and technology and chang-
ing methods of vertical coordination. 
Integrator: Firm that controls, through contracts, ver-
tical integration, or other means, several stages of pro-
duction and marketing. In a contractual relationship,
also referred to as contractor.
Market specification contracts: Commonly referred
to as marketing contracts, these contracts specify a
market outlet for the product and a method of pricing.
The farm producer provides the resources and makes
decisions regarding the production process.
Moral hazard: Modified behavior of a contracting
partner after a contract has been entered. Occurs when
contract performance is not readily observable. 
Open market exchange: Traditional method of
resource transfer in agricultural industries, whereby a
firm remains uncommitted to a specific market outlet
until the production process has been completed. Prices
serve as the coordinating mechanism, generating sig-
nals for adjusting quantity and quality of product.  
Opportunism: Behavior unconstrained by morality
for the purpose of gaining a more favorable outcome
in an exchange relationship. 
Quasi rents: The difference between returns to an
asset in its current use and its next best alternative use.
As asset specificity increases, so does the level of
appropriable quasi rents. 
Quasi-vertical integration: A single firm owns a spe-
cific asset used by a supplier, but does not own the
entire supplying firm. 
Transaction costs: Costs associated with trading,
besides the price. These include costs of searching for
“best” price, and costs of monitoring and enforcing
agreements. 
Transaction cost economics: A branch of the new
institutional economics that attempts to explain alter-
native methods of coordination based on the costs of
transacting under each method. 
Resource-providing contracts: Commonly referred to
as production contracts, these contracts approach verti-
cal integration in degree of control. The integrator pro-
vides important inputs into the production process,
management services, and a market outlet. 
Vertical coordination: Includes all the ways of syn-
chronizing vertical stages of a marketing system (for
example, open market prices, contracting, strategic
alliances, and vertical integration). 
Vertical integration: Method of vertical coordination
representing the greatest degree of control that a firm
can gain over another stage of production.
Coordination of two or more stages occurs under com-
mon ownership via management directive. 
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The U.S. broiler (or young chicken) industry was the
last of the poultry (for example, turkeys) and egg
industries to develop, but now surpasses beef as the
leader in meat production. After World War II, the
broiler industry grew into one of the most integrated of
U.S. agricultural industries. Today, integrators produce
nearly all broilers under contract with growers. Per
capita consumption of broilers in the United States
increased more than 100-fold, from 0.7 pound in 1935
to 72 pounds in 1997, surpassing beef consumption for
the first time in 1993. 
The industrialization of the U.S. pork industry, cur-
rently under way, is also characterized by major
changes in structure and organization, including
changing methods of vertical coordination. Contracts
and, to a lesser extent, vertical integration are replac-
ing hog purchases on the open market. Approximately
40 percent of hog sales to packers were coordinated by
contracts and integrated operations in 1998, compared
with 11 percent in 1993 and only 3 percent in 1980. 
Past studies of organizational changes in the pork
industry have focused solely on the pork industry or
have been largely descriptive in nature (for example,
Rhodes; Hurt; Hyk). Few studies provided a compre-
hensive comparison of changing coordination in the
pork and broiler industries. Yet, there are many simi-
larities between current changes in the pork industry
and past developments in the broiler industry. For
example, contracting and vertical integration in both
industries have been associated with new technology
and new areas of production.
What can be gained by comparing vertical coordina-
tion in the pork and broiler industries? For one thing,
such information can be used by policymakers to facil-
itate decisions regarding antitrust matters. Major
changes in coordinating arrangements in the broiler
industry occurred years ago. If similar incentives exist
for contracting and integration in the pork industry, we
might expect their effects to be similar as well.
Efficiency-improving policies can be better formulated
if firm behavior and factors influencing decision-mak-
ing are better understood. In addition, useful input into
current policy decisions in the pork industry may be
gained by revisiting policymakers’ response to chang-
ing coordinating arrangements in the broiler industry.
The major objective of this report is to compare, using
transaction cost economics and other theories of firm
organization, current changes in vertical coordination
in the U.S. pork industry with past changes in the U.S.
broiler industry. This comparison can be used to obtain
a better perspective of the reasons for current changes
in the pork industry and their potential effects. In the
process, this report also examines the relationship
between increased vertical coordination, retail prices,
and market adjustments in response to consumer pref-
erences for convenient, high-quality products. 
Vertical Coordination in the Pork
and Broiler Industries
Implications for Pork and Chicken Products
Steve W. Martinez
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Although the term “industrialization” is used to
describe current changes occurring in agriculture
(Urban), it was also used to describe major structural
changes in the broiler industry nearly half a century
ago. As the broiler industry grew, contracts and verti-
cal integration played an important role in the adoption
of new technology and the coordination of production
with consumer preferences. The industrialization of the
broiler industry yielded gains in production and mar-
keting efficiencies that lowered the costs of chicken
products. At the same time, the industry achieved a
level of control over production and processing that
has enabled it to respond to consumer preferences for
high-quality, uniform, value-added products. 
The U.S. pork industry in the 1990’s resembles, with
some differences, the broiler industry in its industrial-
ization process (Rhodes; Hurt; Barkema and Cook).
These points are discussed below.1
Growth of the Broiler Industry2
Since the 1930’s, relationships between vertical stages
of the broiler industry (see box, “Vertical Stages of the
Broiler Industry”) have changed significantly.
Coordination of vertical stages through production con-
tracts and integrated operations facilitated the adoption
of new technology and gains in production and market-
ing efficiency. Contractual arrangements between feed
companies and broiler growers encouraged rapid adop-
tion of new production technology. As the broiler
industry grew, these contracts evolved in response to
the changing needs of both the feed company and the
grower. Vertical integration between production and
processing activities resulted in further gains in coordi-
nation between chicken production and demand.  
Background
Before the 1930’s, nearly every farm had a small flock
of chickens for egg production; chicken meat was a
byproduct of these laying flocks. Most frying chickens
were fowl, laying hens that had outlived their fertility.
Young roosters (cockerels) that were superfluous to the
egg-laying flocks were also sold as frying chickens as
a spring delicacy.   
At the time, opportunities existed to raise birds for
their meat on a year-round basis. The genetics of the
cockerels, however, were for desirable laying charac-
teristics rather than for meat. Hen meat was tough, dry,
and strongly flavored, while the quality of the cockerel
meat was only fair. The popularity of spring chicken
suggested that a market existed for establishing a year-
round supply of chicken meat. In an effort to extend
the seasonal consumption pattern, substantial quanti-
ties of chickens were stored and sold in the frozen
New York dressed form.3 Upon thawing, however, the
meat was watery and of poor quality. 
The profit potential inherent in broiler production
became evident during World War II. Unlike the red
meats, poultry was not rationed during the war,
encouraging its consumption. Broiler price ceilings in
place at the time were profitable to the farmer, but
were commonly evaded so that actual broiler prices
exceeded the ceiling price. Broiler production nearly
tripled between 1940 and 1945, despite poor feed
quality and heavy disease losses. 
These developments likely played a role in the postwar
allocation of capital to facilities and research. Adoption
of technological advances in genetics, disease control,
The Role of Changing Vertical Coordination in the Broiler 
and Pork Industries
1The discussion is patterned after the four-step structural change
model developed by Reimund, Martin, and Moore, and recently
applied to the Quebec pork industry (Gillespie, Karantininis, and
Storey). These steps include (1) development of new technology,
(2) production in new geographic areas, (3) growth and develop-
ment, and (4) new methods of vertical coordination.  
2This section is based on information contained in Sawyer;
Knoeber and Thurman; Martin; Roy; Tobin and Arthur; G.B.
Rogers; R.T. Rogers; National Commission on Food Marketing
(NCFM); Bugos; Marion and Arthur; Hyk; and Mighell and Jones.
3“New York dressed” form refers to killing, blooding, and plucking
the chicken without removing the head, feet, and inedible viscera.nutrition, housing, and materials handling in the 10-
year period following the war were substantial (see
box, “New Technology in the Broiler Industry in the
1940’s and 1950’s”). These innovations increased the
size of production units to achieve economies of size
and resulted in substitution of capital for labor. In 1954,
for example, no farms sold 100,000 or more broilers;
by 1964, 12.5 percent of farms sold 100,000 or more
broilers (Reimund, Martin, and Moore). With the devel-
opment of chickens bred for meat quality, broiler pro-
duction could develop independently from the other
poultry enterprises. 
Developments in Contracting
Although technological advances set the stage for
growth and development of the broiler industry, most
broiler growers operated independently at the time. The
grower would buy feed from a dealer, chicks from a
hatchery, and other supplies from another dealer. When
the birds were ready for market, the grower would sell
them to the processor who offered the highest price. 
Financial resource requirements increased as produc-
tion expanded and growers began operating broiler
houses on a scale amenable to the new technology.
Large capital requirements, coupled with declining,
highly variable live broiler prices, made broiler pro-
duction a risky business. Many broiler growers, espe-
cially those in the rural areas of the South, were either
financially unable to operate or unwilling to assume
the price risk. 
Large feed companies recognized the broiler industry’s
potential for growth and the larger market that repre-
sented for their feed.4 Consequently, they established
production contracts with growers. These contracts
later evolved to assure a market outlet for feed sup-
plies, to reduce growers’ financial and income risks,
and to create incentives for growers to produce effi-
ciently. Risk and management responsibilities were
increasingly transferred to the feed companies, also
referred to as integrators (see box, “How Contracts
Evolved in the Broiler Industry”). 
Use of production contracts increased quickly. The
first recorded broiler contract, signed in 1933, involved
a joint sharing of risk and profit between a feed dealer
and grower. In 1950, 95 percent of broiler producers
remained independent (Roy). By 1955, however, after
the large national feed companies moved into broiler-
producing areas of the South, independent producers
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Vertical Stages of the Broiler Industry
Vertical stages of the broiler industry include the breeder farm, hatchery, feed
mill, grow-out farm, processing plant, and retail market. Feed is provided to
both the breeder farm and grow-out farm. Eggs from the breeder farm are sent to
the hatchery. At the hatchery, the eggs are hatched, and the chicks are sent to the
grow-out farm, where the birds are grown to market weight, in about 6 to 8
weeks. The birds are then sent to the processing plant, where they are slaugh-
tered and dressed. The dressed birds are ice-packed or chill-packed (air-chilled)
as whole birds or cut into parts. Other birds are quick-frozen, either in whole
form or as individual pieces, or are shipped to another company-owned plant for
further processing into value-added products, such as frozen nuggets and din-
ners. Processors sell their output to further processors, distributors, or to retail
outlets, composed of the food service segment (institutions and restaurants) and
retail grocery stores.
Source: Rogers, 1992 Consumer
Feed mill
Processor
Retailer
Breeder
Hatchery
Grow-out
4Feed is an important component of the grow-out stage, repre-
senting about 70 to 75 percent of grow-out costs. accounted for only 10 percent of total broiler produc-
tion, whereas 88 percent were produced under a con-
tract arrangement and 2 percent were produced in
company-owned broiler facilities (fig. 1). Nearly all
broilers are grown under contract or in integrator-
owned facilities.5
With the decline of the cotton industry in the South,
the broiler industry’s shift to the use of contracts
encouraged an expansion of broiler production there
(Roy). In 1950, Georgia, North Carolina, Arkansas,
Alabama, and Mississippi accounted for 27 percent of
U.S. broiler production; by 1965, they had become the
top five broiler-producing States in the Nation,
accounting for 60 percent of U.S. production (National
Commission on Food Marketing). Through vertical
contracting arrangements, the use of excess labor at
lower wage rates reduced production costs in the new
production regions.6 Hatchery efficiency gains also
contributed to lower chick prices. In 1961, the cost of
producing broilers in the Southeast was about 15 per-
cent lower than on the Delmarva Peninsula (Delaware,
Maryland, Virginia) (Roy). 
Developments in Vertical Integration 
As broiler production and consumption expanded at a
rapid pace in the 1950’s, supplies and prices became
more unstable (Tobin and Arthur). Shortrun profitabil-
ity considerations led to production decisions that did
not account for longer range considerations affecting
the industry.7 Feed companies often did not communi-
cate with buyers of dressed broilers, who provided
market information. The feed companies were likely to
be overly influenced by fluctuations in the markets for
baby chicks and feed, and out of touch with day-to-day
markets for dressed broilers. This situation created an
imbalance between supplies and demand.  
The Poultry Products Inspection Act (PPIA) of 1957,
which required USDA inspection of all broilers traded
across State lines by January 1, 1959, placed additional
pressure on the industry to increase production. Before
1959, USDA offered voluntary inspections of broilers
for wholesomeness, the results of which were used as a
competitive selling device. The PPIA was designed to
instill consumer confidence and to protect against sub-
standard health practices following a spate of deaths
from bacterial disease traced to contaminated poultry
meat. Many processors needed to make major capital
investments to comply with the new sanitary require-
ments. Consequently, they built new plants to meet the
inspection requirements. From 1958 to 1959, the per-
centage of broilers inspected increased from 25 percent
to 75 percent. At the same time, capacity was increased
and automated processing equipment was updated.
Some increase in capacity, which would have occurred
sooner or later, was squeezed into the 12 to 14 months
before 1959 (Tobin and Arthur). Increased capacity
allowed plants to cover the cost of capital investments
only by operating at greater volumes of production. 
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Figure 1
Proportion of broilers produced under contracts,
vertical integration, and independent production
Production contracts increased rapidly after 1950
1950
1955
1965
1975
1980
1987
1994
0 2 04 06 08 0 1 0 0
Contract
Vertical integration (VI)
Contract and VI
Independent production
Percent
Note: Roy does not distinguish contracting and vertical intergration in 
1950.
Source: Complied by ERS, USDA from Roy; Knutson, Penn, and 
Boehm; Marion; and Manchester.
5Contracts can vary according to the degree of control offered to
the integrator. While most broilers were grown under contract by
1955, contracts continued to evolve.
6Contracting was familiar to southern farmers who had been
sharecroppers (Bugos).
7Operating efficiently within a particular stage of a marketing sys-
tem does not guarantee efficiency of the entire system. The goals of
a single stage may not coincide with the goals of the other stages.In the spring of 1958, integrators placed additional
orders to breeders for more pullets (young hens) to be
placed in the hatchery supply flocks in response to
higher broiler chick prices. This response to current
chick prices was apparently made without regard to
prospective demand for broilers several months in the
future (Tobin and Arthur). At the same time, integra-
tors were building their own hatcheries. The buildup in
the hatchery supply flock in 1958 led to a 13-percent
drop in live broiler prices from 1958 to 1959. Many
hatcheries and feed companies experienced major
losses because of overproduction and depressed broiler
prices. By 1961, live broiler prices had dipped an addi-
tional 14 percent from the depressed 1959 levels. 
Following these drops in broiler prices, further changes in
organization occurred. To coordinate production capacity
at each stage, feed companies became more directly
involved in the broiler business. The feed and hatchery
stages became integrated as many feed companies added
hatcheries and expanded growing operations, possibly
due to the volatility of hatching-egg prices faced by inde-
pendent hatchery operators (Sawyer). Feed companies
also developed closer ties with processors by acquiring or
merging with processors and by building their own pro-
cessing facilities (Sawyer). Processors’day-to-day expo-
sure to the dressed broiler market gave them more market
information than producers, so processors seemed in the
best position to coordinate the hatching-egg operation. By
integrating with the processing stage, feed companies
came in closer contact with the market for dressed broil-
ers and could therefore more closely coordinate broiler
supplies with the consumer market for chicken.   
As feed companies increased their processing opera-
tions, independent processors and independent produc-
ers found themselves with fewer markets for buying
and selling broilers. Consequently, independent
processors established their own contracts with feed
companies to obtain birds or with growers to produce
the birds (National Commission on Food Marketing).
Many smaller independent producers were forced out
of the broiler business, while others purchased their
own processing facilities. 
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Many important technological advances occurred in
nutrition, medicine, buildings and equipment, and
genetics in the 1940's and 1950's. Research on feed
formulations led to substantial improvements in feed
efficiency. In the process of studying vitamin B12,
researchers discovered that growth was being stimu-
lated by properties that were unexplainable by vita-
min B12 itself. This led to the discovery of the antibi-
otic Aureomycin (chlortetracycline), which led to a
completely new era of nutrition research. Not only
did antibiotics serve as growth stimulants, they had
great value in disease control. This enabled flocks to
be grown in confinement. In the early 1950's, anti-
oxidants were introduced, which prevented rancidity
in fat used in high-energy poultry rations. 
To overcome the cost and tedium of feeding birds by
hand, automatic feeding was introduced in the late
1940's, using a specially designed chain to carry feed
along troughs throughout the house. Other equip-
ment innovations included waterers, ventilation
equipment, chick sorters, and feed cleaners.
Around 1950, advances in feed medications allowed
poultry to receive medication through the feed. In addi-
tion, vaccination through drinking water was devel-
oped. These advances were also compatible with the
larger commercial-sized flocks because the entire flock
could be treated at once, which reduced labor costs. 
Substantial investments were also made to develop
strains of chicken that were bred strictly for their
meat qualities. The "Chicken-of-Tomorrow
Program," initiated in 1945, was an annual contest
sponsored by the Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea
Company that became instrumental in encouraging
leading breeders to breed broilers for their meat
qualities, particularly the yield of meat from breasts,
thighs, and drumsticks.
Sources: Hyk; Tobin and Arthur; Sawyer.
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Six basic types of contracts were used in the broiler
industry, including (1) open account, (2) guaranteed
price, (3) flat-fee, (4) sharing, (5) feed conversion,
and (6) combination. 
The first contracts between the integrator (usually a
feed company) and growers were open account con-
tracts. Under these arrangements, credit was extended
that eased the grower's capital constraint. The growers
provided housing, equipment, labor, fuel, and other
inputs. When the broilers were sold, the grower
repaid the debt. Profit to the feed company came
from markups on inputs or a flat service charge. All
profits and losses were sustained by the grower. As
growers began to specialize in broiler production and
rely on the business as a source of income, price and
production risk became more critical. 
Guaranteed price contracts lowered grower price
and output risk and reduced financial constraints.
Under these contracts, the feed company furnished
supplies for a fee. Because the grower was guaran-
teed a certain price when the birds were sold, price
risk was shifted to the integrator. When the contract
price exceeded the cost of inputs, the grower
received the difference. If the guaranteed price did
not cover the cost of supplies advanced to the
grower, the loss was canceled. Hence, some produc-
tion risk was shifted to the integrator as well.
Growers were still subject to input price risk and
excessive capital requirements. Also, a guaranteed
price encouraged shirking by the growers, resulting
in poor-quality birds. 
Flat-fee contracts became the most widely used
arrangements in the 1950's and 1960's. The integrator
provided feed, medicine, and chicks and retained title
to the broilers. The integrator sent advisors to improve
farm production practices. The grower was no longer
indebted to the integrator for inputs. When the birds
were sold, the grower received a "flat fee" per bird,
pound, or week as compensation for labor and some
inputs. Because growers were no longer indebted to
the integrator for inputs, their capital requirements and
output risk were reduced. In addition, input and output
price risks were transferred to the integrator. Because
grower payments were not based on feed efficiency,
and growers' effort was not easily monitored, these
contracts encouraged shirking.
To deter shirking, integrators developed variations of
the flat-fee contract. Under share contracts, the inte-
grator provided the chicks, feed, medicine, and fuel,
while the farmer provided the house, equipment, and
labor. Bird receipts in excess of integrator costs were
shared by the integrator and farmer, thereby giving
each a partial interest in the other's objectives. Losses
were absorbed by the integrator. However, input price
markups by the integrator were encouraged, so that
profits to be shared were lower. In addition, growers
were still subject to burdensome capital requirements
and output price risk and had some incentive to shirk. 
Feed-conversion contracts were designed to provide
an incentive for improved production practices. A
feed-conversion bonus was paid to the grower, along
with the flat fee payment, based on pounds of feed
per pound of bird. The farmer had less incentive to
shirk because income was directly related to perfor-
mance level. However, the grower was still subject to
production risk and capital constraints.  
Combination contracts combined the desirable attrib-
utes of the previously discussed contracts. These
contracts usually involved a flat fee payment to the
grower adjusted by some bonus payment to discour-
age shirking. A bonus was added to the flat fee,
depending on profit-sharing, feed efficiency, mortal-
ity, or some other basis. In addition, the integrator
commonly bases the bonus payment on the grower's
performance relative to other similar growers, rather
than on an absolute standard. For instance, a grower
may receive payment based on an average cost of
production, which is then adjusted up or down
depending on the individual grower's cost compared
with the average.
Source: Martin.
How Contracts Evolved in the Broiler IndustryIn the 1970’s, many feed companies left the broiler
industry because of depressed broiler prices and high
input costs (Hyk). Processors took over ownership of
almost all stages to gain efficiencies from improved
coordination (Rogers, 1992). The processors’ role as
integrator was influenced by the significant economies
of size in poultry processing and the large proportion
of value added in processing (George Morris Centre).8
The major integrators recently expanded into the basic
breeding of the broiler stock as well (Rogers, 1992). In
1985, a British subsidiary of the Cobb Company, a pri-
mary breeder owned by Upjohn, introduced the Cobb
500 female line into the United States. The Cobb 500
resulted in a large, easily deboned breast that provided 2
percent more breast meat. The new bird appealed to
Tyson Foods, a large integrator that served most of the
institutional market, where frozen, deboned breasts were
sold. To prevent competitors from monopolizing the
breed, Tyson initially purchased half ownership in the
Cobb Company (Bugos). In 1994, Tyson increased its
ownership interest to 100 percent by acquiring Upjohn’s
remaining 50-percent interest. The Cobb Company con-
tinued to improve the bird to produce larger and more
uniform breast yields that Tyson demanded. 
Productivity Gains
Rapid adoption of new technology had an unprece-
dented impact on production efficiency, costs, and out-
put in the broiler industry. By 1990, a ton of feed could
produce 43 percent more broiler meat than in 1955.
More automated equipment, larger houses, and more
productive birds increased the productivity of farm
labor. In the late 1940’s, approximately 5.1 hours were
required to produce 100 pounds of broilers; that had
declined to about 0.1 hour by the late 1970’s (fig. 2).
Production costs fell by approximately half in the two
decades following World War II. Over the same period,
deflated costs fell by 65 percent. In the early 1970’s,
deflated production costs continued to fall, despite
rapidly increasing input prices (for example, feed and
energy). Production efficiency gains generated a five-
fold increase in broiler supplies from 1946 to 1957, and
another five-fold increase from 1957 to 1997. 
Developments in the retail sector also influenced the
broiler industry. Following World War II, supermar-
kets, relying on price and advertising, replaced 
specialty meat markets to the benefit of the broiler
industry. Supermarkets often used broilers as price
leaders because they sold at lower prices than other
meats. This practice reinforced consumers’ percep-
tions of broilers as a good buy and played a role in the
tremendous expansion in broiler consumption and
broadening of the broiler market without direct 
promotional expense by the producer (Tobin and
Arthur). In addition, selling eviscerated (cleaned and
disemboweled) chicken appealed to the retailer
because it saved butchers’ time and to the consumer
because it was convenient.
Current Status of the Broiler Industry  
Most major processors control the vertical stages in
the broiler industry, from breeders to market-ready
products, through vertical integration and resource-
providing contracts, typically referred to as produc-
tion contracts. These processor-integrators, such as
Tyson, breed the parent stock, produce hatching eggs,
and hatch the eggs. Providing baby chicks, feed, vet-
erinary services, and advice, they contract with grow-
ers to raise the chicks. Growers provide the chicken
houses and labor. The production contracts specify a
payment per pound of live broiler produced, depend-
ing on the grower’s relative performance. The grown
broilers are then slaughtered and dressed for market.
Further processing may be accomplished in com-
pany-owned plants or by other processors who do not
slaughter the birds. Plants are typically specially
designed for the primary product form (for example,
cut up, deboning, or product preparation for food ser-
vice companies).  
In such an integrated marketing system, the only point
where basic supply and demand conditions generate a
publicly visible price is at the interface between the
processor and retailer (or distributor). As products
become more processed, even this price information
becomes less available. Many restaurants have entered
long-term contracts with processors or distributors to
avoid volatile broiler prices and offer stable menu
prices for consumers (Rogers, 1992). While some con-
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tracts are based on cost-plus formulas, the terms are not
disclosed.
Recent Developments in Vertical 
Coordination of the Pork Industry
Many of the current structural changes in the pork
industry resemble past changes in the broiler industry.9
In both industries, new methods of vertical coordina-
tion are associated with new technology, geographical
shifts in production, growth in firm size, and improved
production efficiency. There are also differences
between the industrialization process in the pork and
broiler industries.
Technological and Organizational 
Innovations
New technological innovations and increased special-
ization in hog production are encouraging a larger
number of animals at a given production site (Hurt).
Advances have occurred in genetics, nutrition, housing
and handling equipment, veterinary medicine, and
management that improve the health of the hogs and
reduce risks associated with hog production. This tech-
nology is applied to large production units to reduce
fixed costs per hog. In the 1970’s and 1980’s, hogs
were typically produced on farrow-to-finish farms, that
is, farms with a breeding herd where the pigs are
raised from birth to market. More recently, hog pro-
duction has shifted to specialized farms at three differ-
ent sites, separated by location. The first site is used
for breeding, gestation, and farrowing. After weaning,
the pigs are moved to a second site, a nursery facility,
where they receive special diets and care. Once they
reach 8-10 weeks of age and 40-60 pounds, they are
transported to the finishing facility, the third site,
where they are fed to market weight. This system
reduces the risk of disease outbreaks and results in
improved use of labor and facilities. 
Paralleling the broiler industry, new methods of orga-
nizing hog production are contributing to industrializa-
tion. Large hog producers, typically referred to as inte-
grators, or contractors, establish production contracts
with smaller growers to feed the hogs to market weight.
The producer-integrator provides management services,
feeder pigs, medicine, and other inputs, while a grower
provides the labor and facilities. In return, the grower
receives a fixed payment, adjusted for production effi-
ciency. These arrangements allow integrators to grow
rapidly by leveraging their capital. For example, instead
of investing in all buildings and equipment required for
a farrow-to-finish operation, the integrator can invest in
9Stages of the pork system include the breeding stock sector, hog
production sector, the packing/processing sector, and retail markets
for pork products.
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Lasley, Jones, Easterling,and Christensen; and Rogers, 1992.specialized facilities, such as farrowing units, while the
grower may own the remaining facilities, such as the
nurseries and finishing facilities. This arrangement
allows the integrator to build more farrowing units, for
example, because the integrator does not have to invest
in nurseries and finishing facilities. By building more
farrowing units with a given investment, more hogs
can be produced. Integrators can also apply their man-
agement expertise in finance, genetics, nutrition, engi-
neering, veterinary medicine, and animal husbandry to
a greater number of pigs. Because the integrator pro-
vides many of the variable inputs and guarantees a
payment to the grower, risk associated with input and
output price variability is shifted from the grower to
the integrator (Martin).
Growth in Nontraditional Regions
Like the broiler industry, the hog industry is growing
most rapidly in areas that had not earlier produced many
hogs, including the Southeast and, to a lesser extent, the
West and Southwest. Growth in the Southeast is domi-
nated by expansion in North Carolina, where hog inven-
tories have more than tripled since 1989, compared with
a 5-percent increase nationwide. North Carolina is now
the second leading State, after Iowa, in hog inventories,
and the leader in number of pigs born (pig crop).
Slaughter capacity has followed hog production to non-
traditional areas (Boehlje and others). Smithfield Foods,
for example, recently opened the world’s largest pack-
ing plant in North Carolina. 
The dramatic increase in hog production in the
Southeast is due in part to the increase in contracting
in hog production and the decline in the tobacco indus-
try. North Carolina farmers quickly accepted contract-
ing because of the State’s familiarity with production
contracts in poultry. Lenders see contracting operations
as a way to stabilize farm income in the face of poten-
tial losses in tobacco revenue (Hurt). 
Hog producers in nontraditional areas of production
can compete with the traditional areas because they
can realize efficiency gains through improved manage-
rial and production techniques. Large, environmentally
controlled facilities, which spread costs over a larger
number of animals and improve production efficiency,
gave producers in emerging areas distinct cost advan-
tages (McBride). 
Structural Changes
Innovations in production have lowered costs for firms
operating at higher levels of output. Most of the
rapidly expanding large hog production operations are
operating at costs that are $3 to $5 per hundredweight
(cwt) below the costs of most more traditional opera-
tors (Rhodes). Large specialized farms have total costs
of production that are 10.6 percent lower than smaller
farrow-to-finish operations, excluding advantages in
input prices (Good). Feed produced at large centralized
mills and hauled to farms is replacing feed from small,
onfarm feed mills. Larger feed mills may be able to
manufacture feed with more precise ration formulation
and more uniform nutrient content. They can usually
buy ingredients in large volume at lower cost and
quickly change ingredients in response to relative price
changes. These factors may outweigh the cost of haul-
ing corn to the mill and feed to the farm. The mill may
be owned by a large-scale hog producer or by a pro-
ducer cooperative, or it may contract to manufacture
feed (Martinez, Smith, and Zering). 
While declining real hog and pork prices have forced
many small hog producers out of business, others have
expanded production to reduce unit costs.
Consequently, the number of hog farms has fallen,
while average size has increased. Growth in the size of
hog farms, led by the nontraditional areas of produc-
tion, is indicated by the percentage of hogs on farms
with 1,000 hogs or more. The percentage of hogs raised
on operations with inventories greater than 1,000 head
increased from 37 percent of the U.S. swine population
in 1987 to 47 percent in 1992 and 71 percent in 1997.
In North Carolina, nearly 98 percent of hogs resided on
these large farms in 1997, compared with 63 percent in
Iowa (the leading hog-producing State).  
As new packing plants have increased in size in the
1990’s, the number of federally inspected plants has
fallen (USDA[f]).10 The rapid shift to much larger plant
sizes over the past decade reflects an effort to capture
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apparent economies of size. In 1986, 19 plants,
accounting for 50 percent of total slaughter at federally
inspected plants, had annual processing capacity that
exceeded 1.5 million head. By 1997, 29 plants with 1.5
million head of capacity accounted for 84 percent of
hogs processed. Six plants had annual capacity exceed-
ing 3.5 million head per year in 1997 and accounted for
29 percent of all hogs processed in the United States. 
New Methods of Vertical Coordination
Hog production and packing have traditionally been
coordinated through open market exchange, where
sales are made after production is completed. In other
words, the producer’s position remains “open” until
the product is ready for sale. Coordination is accom-
plished through price signals that provide incentives to
adjust the quantity and quality of production. Higher
prices for a particular product or quality bring addi-
tional resources into production. A grading system dis-
tinguishes demand for various quality attributes.
Market-specification contracts, commonly referred to
as marketing contracts, between the large hog pro-
ducer-integrators and large packers, are an important
factor in the phenomenal growth of hog production in
nontraditional areas. These contracts typically specify
that the producer deliver a certain quantity of hogs, to
a certain location, at a specified time. In return, the
producer receives a market-based price that is adjusted
for quality premiums. The contract assures large pro-
ducers an outlet for their hogs and compensation for
quality improvements. With a large, stable flow of
high-quality, uniform hogs, the packer can reduce
costs associated with variable supply flows, poor-qual-
ity hogs, and product losses due to condemnations and
quality problems (such as excess fat or abscesses). In
the North Carolina/Virginia region, hogs were
imported until the mid-1990’s, when production levels
reached and surpassed slaughter quantities (fig. 3).
Multiyear marketing contracts facilitated the coordi-
nated growth in hog production and slaughter.
Multiyear marketing contracts between large packers
and large hog producer-integrators are rapidly replacing
open market transactions (fig. 4). In 1970 and 1980,
less than 2 percent of hogs were obtained by packers
through contracts or integrated operations. Hayenga
and others (1996) surveyed 19 large packers in 1994,
accounting for 86 percent of U.S. hog slaughter in
1993. Assuming that packers excluded from the survey
do not contract or vertically integrate, the percentage of
hogs obtained by packers from contracts and vertical
integration in the United States was approximately 11
percent in 1993. The remainder was purchased on the
open market using “spot” prices at the packing plant or
company buying stations, or spot prices from dealers,
order buyers, terminals, and auctions. In 1999, 59 per-
cent of hogs in the United States were obtained through
multiyear contracting or integration.
Changes in coordinating arrangements are also
reflected at the breeder-producer interface. Small fam-
ily farm purebred breeders are being replaced by large,
highly sophisticated breeder companies who will often
develop specific genetic lines for a large producer’s
own breeding herd (Schrader). A large breeding stock
company can supply large producers with sufficient
volume at one time. Smaller producers often buy
replacement boars and gilts (young females) for the
breeding herd by negotiation in an open market. Large
producers, however, who tend to be on a schedule that
requires specific timing and supplies of closely speci-
fied products, often use long-term arrangements to
obtain gilts or boars (or semen) at formula prices.  
Productivity gains in pork production have added signif-
icantly to U.S. pork supplies since the late 1970’s.
Technological advances have yielded more litters per
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sow, more pigs weaned per litter, and improved feed
efficiency. The average number of pigs weaned per litter
reached 8.64 in 1997, compared with 7.04 in 1978 (fig.
5). Heavier hogs and greater dressing yields at the pack-
ing plant have led to increased meat production per hog.
A given quantity of pork meat can now be produced
with fewer hogs, less labor, and less feed. Because of
these productivity gains, pork production per head of
breeding stock rose from 1,400 pounds in 1978 to 2,500
pounds in 1997 (fig. 5). Industrialization of the pork
industry has been especially apparent since the 1990’s,
which heralded the arrival of the “mega producers”
(operations with inventories of at least 2,000 head). The
percentage of the U.S. swine population raised by the
mega producers nearly doubled from 28.8 percent in
1992 to 55 percent in 1997 (USDA[e]). Since 1990,
total pork production has increased by an annual aver-
age of 1.8 percent per year. In the 1980’s, the annual
average increase in pork production was 0.5 percent. 
Differences Between the Broiler 
and Pork Industries
Although significant changes in organization are
occurring in the pork industry, there are some differ-
ences between the pork and broiler industries. The
broiler marketing system remains more highly inte-
grated. Breeding, feeding, hatching, and processing are
vertically integrated functions, while production con-
tracts are used to coordinate production with process-
ing (fig. 6). Marketing contracts are relatively unim-
portant for the broiler industry. On the other hand,
marketing contracts between the hog producer-integra-
tors and packers (processors) are becoming increas-
ingly important. Marketing contracts give the packer
less control over production than do the production
contracts used by the broiler processor-integrators.
Production contracts between large hog producer-inte-
grators and growers also are becoming more impor-
tant. These contracts are similar to those between
broiler growers and processors. Distinguishing
between production and marketing contracts in the
pork industry is especially important because they
serve different functions.  
The pork industry is faced with several obstacles to a
continuation of recent trends in organization. Unlike
the broiler industry, the pork industry has a large core
of independent hog producers selling on the open mar-
ket. These producers will likely resist further moves
toward contracting and integration in the hog industry,
despite the competitive pressures placed on them to
find a market for their hogs. 
As consumers have become more concerned about the
effects of their food choices on the environment
(Kinsey), potential air and water pollution associated
with manure from large hog operations may also cre-
ate obstacles to further expansion. The pork industry
mastered a method of organizing production that could
be quickly replicated, which enabled rapid growth of
hog operations. This seriously taxed existing environ-
mental regulations and has led some States, North
Carolina for instance, to impose moratoriums on new
large hog production units. In addition, some localities
have attempted to enact strict local ordinances that
supersede existing State laws. Local residents often
fear that unchecked expansion of hog operations will
lower the quality of life and land values by contami-
nating water and air. On the other hand, large produc-
ers are concerned that stricter environmental regula-
tions will limit their ability to reap the benefits of size
economies associated with new technology. In addi-
tion, some legislative leaders claim that the large hog
operations are important to their State’s economy.    
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As defined in the pioneering effort by Mighell and
Jones, vertical coordination includes all the ways that
vertical stages of a marketing system are synchro-
nized. Methods of coordination can be classified
according to the degree of control over other vertical
stages. At one end of the spectrum is open market
coordination, representing the least control. Open
market coordination refers to sales that are made after
production has been completed. At the other end of
the spectrum is vertical integration, representing the
most control. Vertical integration refers to ownership
and management of two or more successive stages of
the marketing system by a single firm. Intermediate
forms of coordination, which lie between open mar-
ket coordination and vertical integration on the spec-
trum of control, include quasi-vertical integration
and contracting. Quasi-vertical integration occurs
when a firm owns a specific asset that is used by one
of its suppliers. Contracting includes market-specifi-
cation contracts and resource-providing contracts.
Market-specification contracts typically specify a
market outlet, delivery schedule, and method for
determining the price. Resource-providing contracts,
in addition to providing for a market outlet, provide
for direct participation by both parties in the manage-
ment of farm production and the provision of impor-
tant inputs.  
There is extensive theoretical literature regarding the
motives for contracting and vertical integration. This
section applies this theory to the broiler and pork
industries. Incentives for contracting and vertical inte-
gration include reducing transaction costs, reducing
price and quantity risk, and financing production
inputs.11 By understanding the motives for such
arrangements, one can better understand their potential
effects on the quantity, quality, and prices of pork and
chicken products.
Transaction Costs
Transaction costs are expenses associated with carry-
ing out a transaction. These include costs related to:
insufficient information regarding terms of the transac-
tion; searching for the “best” price; negotiating, moni-
toring, and enforcing contracts; and costs of relaying
information in vertically integrated operations.
Transaction cost economics seeks to explain the vari-
ety of organizational arrangements that are used to
coordinate resource transfers across stages of produc-
tion. The central theme underlying transaction cost
economics is that the efficiency of alternative organi-
zational arrangements is measured by the costs of trad-
ing under each (Masten). Contracting and vertical inte-
gration in the broiler and pork industries offer incen-
tives for reducing transaction costs associated with
asset specificity, measuring and sorting costs of the
traded goods, and assuring supplies and market outlets. 
Asset Specificity
An important feature of industrialization in both the
broiler and pork industries is the development of new
production technology. Advances in feed formulations,
production facilities and equipment, nutrition, and dis-
ease control result in scale economies for larger opera-
tions. Genetically improved breeding stock enable pro-
ducers to select highly productive animals with traits
that producers, processors, and consumers value. 
Highly technical production processes may require spe-
cific assets—assets whose value is much greater in a
particular use than in the next best alternative. Specific
assets include physical, site, and temporal forms. An
asset’s unique physical characteristics can make it a
specific asset. Hatcheries, broiler houses, feed facilities,
and processing plants, for example, can be considered
specific assets because they have few alternative uses
(Reimund, Martin, and Moore; Sawyer; Marion and
Arthur). An asset’s location can also make it a specific
asset. When one party to a transaction, for example,
locates its facilities close to the other party in an
attempt to lower transportation costs, the asset may
Application of Vertical Coordination Theories to the Broiler
and Pork Industries
11Motives related to market power also exist. Discussion of these
motives is in the section “Policy Responses to New Methods of
Vertical Coordination.”acquire a site-specific value. Temporal specificity arises
when the timing of performance is critical, such as with
perishable agricultural commodities (Masten). Many
vegetables, for example, require processing soon after
harvest to maintain quality (Manchester). After farmers
invest in production inputs, processors may delay deliv-
ery to extract price discounts. 
Specific assets may generate quasi-rents, which mea-
sure the value of the asset in excess of its next best
alternative use. To illustrate, consider the example pro-
vided by Gallick. A horse carriage can be rented to
transport tourists for $180 per day or rented as a
museum piece for $100 per day. In this case, the quasi-
rent is $80 per day. 
Opportunistic behavior (self-interested behavior
unconstrained by morality) may reallocate quasi-rents
from the owner of the specific assets to the trading
partner. Once the owner has invested in the specific
assets, the other party may offer a lower price than
specified before the investment. However, whether the
quasi-rent is appropriable depends on a small-numbers
condition (small number of bidders in the market)
(Williamson, 1975).12 Continuing the example, if there
is only one bidder for the horse carriage to transport
tourists, then the entire quasi-rent could potentially be
appropriated by that bidder. That is, the bidder could
decide to pay less than $180. As long as the offer
exceeds the value of the carriage as a museum piece
($100), the owner of the carriage is better off renting it
to transport tourists. However, if there are several bid-
ders for the carriage to transport tourists at $180 per
day, then the $80 in quasi-rents would not be appropri-
able. As asset specificity increases, parties become
more susceptible to opportunism in the presence of
few bidders (Williamson, 1975). 
The threat of opportunistic behavior may result in wel-
fare losses because mutually-advantageous trades do
not occur (Milgrom and Roberts). For example, invest-
ment in a large-scale production operation that benefits
producers, processors, and consumers may not be
made for fear of opportunism. 
The use of specific assets to produce intermediate
goods may serve as an incentive to vertically contract
or integrate to protect the asset owner from opportunis-
tic behavior (Klein, Crawford, and Alchian). Contracts
can help to place limits on acceptable behavior. Vertical
integration can alleviate adversarial relationships. 
Asset specificity in the broiler industry is significant,
which may influence the types of coordinating arrange-
ments used. Broiler housing facilities, processing plants,
and breeding stock have a low value outside of their
intended purpose (physical asset specificity).13 Broiler
growers tend to be located close to feed mills and pro-
cessing facilities because broilers are perishable com-
modities (temporal specificity) and transportation costs
of feed, chicks, and grown broilers are high (site speci-
ficity) (Lajili; Marion and Arthur).14 Because processing
must occur soon after production has been finished,
broilers are considered to be perishable. Delays at this
stage may elicit price concessions from the producer
who would be hard pressed to find alternative markets
on short notice. Following the broiler depression in the
early 1960’s, feed suppliers integrated with processors
to assure themselves of a market for their broilers. (Hog
producers, however, may have more time to find suit-
able market outlets. Temporal specificity may partially
explain why the broiler industry has integrated its pro-
duction and processing stages, while the pork industry
is coordinated through marketing contracts.) Another
form of asset specificity in the broiler industry is site
specificity. Spatial concentration of processor-integra-
tors may reduce the number of alternative trading part-
ners for the broiler growers because the processor-inte-
grators prefer to obtain broilers within a 20-mile radius
(Rogers, 1992). Contracts between growers and an
integrator reduce the likelihood of opportunistic behav-
ior on the part of the integrator. 
Investments necessary to take advantage of economies
of size in hog production and processing may also be
considered as site-specific assets (Martinez, Smith, and
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transported greater distances (Rogers, 1992).Zering). These substantial investments are highly spe-
cific to both parties and neither can survive in the long
term by transporting hogs long distances. Producers
located near one or a few processors may be subjected
to opportunistic behavior by the processor. Once the
producer’s facilities are built, the processor may attempt
to gain some of the quasi-rents accruing to the producer
by offering lower prices for hogs. Similarly, a processor
that locates in an area with few producers would be sub-
ject to opportunistic behavior by the producer. In this
case, quasi-rents are the difference between the local
price and the price of more distantly located hogs. 
Multiyear marketing contracts between hog producers
and processors may reduce the likelihood of oppor-
tunistic behavior related to site-specific assets. Asset
specificity, together with the small-numbers condition,
may account for the disparity in procurement methods
used by the two largest pork packers, Smithfield Foods
and IBP. Smithfield owns approximately 10 percent of
the hogs that it slaughters and obtains 52 percent from
multiyear marketing contracts with several large hog
producers (Smithfield Foods, Form 10K, filed with
Securities and Exchange Commission July 25, 1997).
It also possesses 72 percent of packing capacity in the
South Atlantic region (North Carolina, Virginia, South
Carolina, Georgia, and Tennessee). On the other hand,
IBP’s main supply of hogs is purchased daily on the
open market by buying agents (IBP, Form 10K, filed
with Securities and Exchange Commission March 26,
1998). IBP is located in the North Central region
(Illinois, Iowa, Minnesota, Missouri, Kansas, Indiana,
Nebraska, South Dakota, and Kentucky), where no one
packer possesses more than 25 percent of available
packing capacity. Hog producers also tend to be
smaller and more numerous in the North Central
region than in the South Atlantic region. 
Marketing contracts can also reduce the incidence of
opportunistic behavior associated with investments to
improve hog quality (physical asset specificity). Once a
producer makes the investment, the premium for the
higher quality hogs becomes a quasi-rent that can be
appropriated to the packer (Martinez, Smith, and
Zering). The producer can either accept the lower pre-
mium or sell the hogs on the open market and receive no
premium. For example, carcass value pricing, which
refers to carcass weighing and inspection after slaughter
to determine price premiums and discounts, has become
the chief method for pricing hogs.15 Packers currently
pay premiums to producers of large and lean hogs.
Selection of breeding stock to produce leaner hogs, how-
ever, has led to increased incidence of the stress gene,
which is associated with pale, soft, exudative (PSE) pork
(tough, dry, and lean pork).16 Investments in breeding
stock to reduce the incidence of PSE pork may be con-
sidered a specific asset. Once the investment is made, the
premium for PSE pork over the open market price
offered by the packer becomes a quasi-rent that can be
appropriated to the packer. Because open markets do not
include premiums for hogs bred from genetic lines that
are free of the stress gene, the packer can lower the pre-
mium initially offered. The producer can either accept
the lower premium or sell the specially bred hogs on the
open market for no premium. Marketing contracts that
specify payment of quality premiums reduce the likeli-
hood of this type of opportunistic behavior. 
Furthermore, premiums can vary substantially among
packers because they have different processing equip-
ment and may serve different markets. They may also
use different methods to determine carcass premiums
and discounts. For example, because consumers prefer
consistency in the products they purchase, packers dis-
count their prices for carcasses that do not provide the
size of cuts desired. An analysis of carcass value pric-
ing schemes used by 10 large packers found that 2
packers paid no premiums for lean, when carcasses
were below 160 pounds, while other packers paid a
range of premiums (Kenyon, McKissick, and
Lawrence). Seven packers used backfat and loin depth
to compute percent lean, while three packers used
backfat measurement only. Differences among pricing
schemes, which make it difficult for producers to com-
pare prices, increase the potential for opportunistic
behavior by the packer after the producer has invested
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live weight.
16Pale, soft, exudative pork occurs when the muscle from the pork
carcass is pale in color, has a soft texture, and is watery (exudative).
Because PSE pork is more susceptible to moisture loss, processors
and retailers can experience significant costs due to reduced pro-
cessing and storage yields. Panel scores suggest that pale-colored
pork is less acceptable to consumers (McKeith, Ellis, and Carr).
PSE pork is also less tender because of increased cooking losses.in specific breeding stock. Long-term marketing con-
tracts can reduce the likelihood of opportunism in the
production of pork with unique quality characteristics.
Measuring and Sorting Costs
Quality attributes of the raw product may have an impor-
tant influence on processing costs and value of the final
product. For example, processors may reduce their costs
by processing leaner hogs because of lower handling
costs and more salable meat. In addition, consumers may
be willing to pay a premium for leaner pork. In the pork
industry, important quality factors for processors and
consumers include hog size, leanness, uniformity, and
PSE. Important quality attributes for processors and con-
sumers in the broiler industry include size of the birds,
uniformity, and yield of high-value breast meat. 
Measuring and sorting costs associated with quality
attributes of the raw product can be reduced by con-
tracts between the producer and processor or by vertical
integration. Producers and processors may have differ-
ent information for determining whether the terms of a
transaction are acceptable or whether they are being
met. This situation is referred to as asymmetric informa-
tion. For example, producers may have more accurate
information regarding the quality of their product. If this
information is freely available, then equally valued
products will sell at an equal price. When quality infor-
mation is costly to obtain, however, producers may
attempt to sell high- and low-quality products at the
same price. Hence, buyers may demand costly measure-
ment of raw product attributes to determine its value,
and inaccuracies could result in wealth transfers
(Barzel). In addition, if quality attributes of the raw
product vary, then costly sorting may be required to
determine its value. If the quality of the intermediate or
final product can be controlled by the producer, how-
ever, then the processor can reduce the cost of presale
measuring and sorting by changing the method of coor-
dination. Long-term contracts that specify quality attrib-
utes, and direct control through vertical integration, may
reduce the need for costly measuring.17 Contracting or
vertical integration becomes more likely as the value of
the good becomes more uncertain because the opportu-
nity for exploiting errors in measurement increases. 
To illustrate, consider the following example para-
phrased from Barzel. While the weight of an orange
can be measured at virtually no cost, weight provides
little information as to the true value of the orange.
The skin of the orange hides information regarding its
taste and juiciness, and direct measurement of these
attributes by peeling and squeezing at the time of pur-
chase is costly. Hence, the quality attributes of the
orange are subject to measurement error. The producer
may attempt to exploit errors in measurement by
charging equivalent prices for both low- and high-qual-
ity oranges. To prevent such opportunistic behavior,
the purchaser may incur expenditures to measure the
value of the oranges. New methods of coordination,
however, may limit expenditures for this purpose: 1. If
a seller agrees to deliver a certain quality of oranges
under a contractual agreement, the purchaser’s need
for presale testing of quality declines: 2. By combining
both the production and processing of the oranges in a
single firm (vertical integration), the need for costly
measuring is lessened.
On the open market, several buying agents may be
required to purchase hogs that conform to the specifi-
cations of the packer. Attributes that are difficult to
measure at the time of grading, such as PSE, may
require costly testing that is prone to errors. Because
the value of hogs is largely determined by genetics and
weight, the use of long-term contracts between pro-
ducers and packers that specify quality characteristics
may reduce measuring and sorting costs. Large pack-
ers favored long-term contracts chiefly as a means of
assuring the quality and consistency of hogs (Hayenga
and others). Half of the large packers surveyed
required minimum quantity and quality specifications
or specific genetic requirements. Direct control
through vertical integration can also reduce measuring
and sorting costs.
The broiler industry uses production contracts and ver-
tical integration to control size, aesthetics, and unifor-
mity for meeting the quality requirements of slaughter
plants and the specifications of retail customers.
Because many contract growers supply one processing
facility, replication of growing conditions, such as the
16 v Vertical Coordination in the Pork and Broiler Industries Economic Research Service/USDA
17Hennessy develops a theoretical model that demonstrates
incentives to vertically integrate because testing for quality is
costly and subject to error. use of high-quality inputs, and proper management,
are very important for producing high-quality, uniform
birds. The specific requirements of production con-
tracts reduce variations in birds across grower flocks
and over time. The contracts generally provide man-
agement services and may require each facility to have
the same equipment. Growers are trained in proper
management practices. Water and feed placement, for
example, can have an important effect on broiler qual-
ity as chickens may suffer scratches on their skin from
crowding around an inadequate number of feeders
(Stillwell). Feed ingredients and genetics also have an
important influence on broiler quality. By vertically
integrating into breeding, most of the major processors
directly control the genetics of the breeder chicks
(Rogers, 1992). Feed from processor-owned feed mills
also helps to ensure that each grower obtains similar,
customized feed ingredients.  
With uniformity of birds resulting from control over
production inputs and management services, mecha-
nized processing and handling became possible
(Bugos; Rogers, 1992). This is illustrated by the proce-
dure used to slaughter birds. Live broilers are hung by
their feet on shackles that roll by on a chain. As they
move through the plant, they are electrically stunned,
bled, plucked, and eviscerated, emerging as dressed
broilers. Throughout the entire process they are seldom
touched by human hands. Such automation would not
be possible with varied body shapes. In 1961, Holly
Farms became an integrated company by adding hatch-
eries, feed mills, a breeder flock, and a processing
plant, and contracting for broiler growing. By 1964,
Holly Farms was the first to commercially market
broilers that were prepackaged at the processing plant,
which required close quality control at all stages
(Marion and Arthur). 
Production contracts with growers can also reduce
measuring and sorting costs related to pathogen con-
tent by allowing the processor to implement quality
controls quickly and thoroughly. Stricter food safety
performance standards place a greater burden on the
slaughter plant, which in turn, places greater pressure
on live production to help meet the stricter regulations
(Stillwell). As additional research into pathogen con-
trol proliferates and new management practices are
identified, these practices can be quickly implemented
through production contracts. Furthermore, production
contracts provide a means of tracing the animals back
to the farm of origin. 
Supply and Demand Assurance 
By contracting or vertically integrating, firms may
increase the likelihood of obtaining a given flow of
live animals to avoid costly overuse or underuse of
processing facilities. Modern, efficient processing
plants can lower unit processing costs, as well as retail
meat prices, compared with older and smaller plants
(fig. 7). Large fixed costs associated with processing,
however, suggest that deviating from the optimal uti-
lization level can lead to substantial increases in costs.
In modern processing plants designed to operate effi-
ciently at a stable output level, costs rise quickly when
output is highly variable (Barkema and Drabenstot).
This is illustrated in figure 7 by the more sharply
sloped shortrun average cost curve for modern plants
(SRAC’). When the flow of raw inputs is highly vari-
able, variations in output lead to larger increases in per
unit costs than with the older plants. Hence, it
becomes more important to control the quantity and
scheduling of live animal inputs. 
Contractual arrangements have been used in both the
broiler and pork industries to assure supplies of live
animals. Large packers indicate that “increased vol-
ume” of hogs delivered to the slaughter plant is an
important reason for multiyear marketing contracts
(Hayenga and others). Marketing contracts may specify
the number of hogs per day or week to be delivered. 
Contracting and integration can also reduce uncertain-
ties related to market outlets. Feed suppliers found that
by establishing production contracts with broiler grow-
ers, they were assured of a potentially large market for
their feed supplies. Large hog producers ranked
“assured market outlet” for their hogs as the most
important reason for contracting (Hayenga and others).  
Price and Production Risk 
Price and production risks in agricultural industries
can lead to highly variable incomes. The relationship
between inputs and output is subject to many uncer-
tainties, such as weather, disease, and accidents. A por-
tion of this production risk is specific to the particular
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risks are common to many producers, such as weather
conditions. Producers also face risk related to market
prices of inputs and output. 
By paying producers according to a relative measure of
performance, contracts can serve to shift price and pro-
duction risk from producers to integrators.18 Price risk
for live broilers is not borne by the growers because
their payment is independent of feed prices and broiler
market prices. In addition, growers receive a payment
that depends on their performance relative to others.
When each grower’s performance is affected, the pay-
ment remains unchanged. This reduces production risk
that is common to each grower, such as unfavorable
weather. Growers still bear that portion of production
risk that affects only the performance of their flock.  
Broiler industry production contracts evolved to trans-
fer more price and output risk from the grower to the
integrator.19 Disease and heavy mortality were origi-
nally the main sources of uncertainty. As disease losses
decreased, prices became a relatively more important
source of uncertainty. By contracting with several
flocks, feed suppliers were in a better position to man-
age uncertainties, while supplying necessary resources,
because the feed supplier was concerned with average
mortality and prices for several flocks over the entire
year. These averages could be predicted with greater
certainty because they varied less than the mortality
rates and prices faced by an individual grower.
Consequently, the feed supplier transformed a high
degree of uncertainty faced by an individual grower
into a smaller calculated risk (Mighell and Jones).
Income uncertainty entails a cost to producers that
would reduce the supply of broilers, if producers are
risk averse (Knoeber and Thurman). This suggests that
reductions in the cost of managing risk contributed to
continual increases in broiler supplies. 
Shifts in price risk and common production risk from
the grower to the integrator have two basic purposes
(Knoeber and Thurman). First, incentives are improved
if risk is borne by the party with the greatest control
over outcomes (that is, the integrator). Second, the cost
of risk is reduced when borne by the party that can
manage it most cheaply. Shareholders of publicly held
integrators hold diversified portfolios of income-pro-
ducing assets, thereby reducing the cost of risk bear-
ing. Private companies, like Cargill, by producing a
variety of products, can reduce their costs of risk bear-
ing. Of 54 integrated broiler companies, 10 were pub-
licly held in 1990 (Knoeber and Thurman). These 10,
accounting for 53 percent of broiler production,
included Tyson Foods, ConAgra, Hudson Foods, and
Seaboard Corporation.  
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18Many producers are willing to accept lower payments for
reductions in uncertainties about prices and production (Mighell
and Jones).
19Uncertainty becomes even more important as asset specificity
increases (Williamson; Shelanski and Klein). Increasing asset
specificity related to buildings and equipment likely exacerbated
the role of volatile markets in the rapid growth of production con-
tracting and vertical integration.
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Figure 7
Effect on the retail stage of operating processing
plants at optimum capacity
Modern processing plants are more efficient, but that efficiency
comes at a price; the steeper curve in the modern plant means 
that its costs rise quickly if the volume of production varies much
from the optimal level
Note: S and S' are the aggregate retail supply curves associated with
production in old and modern plants, respectively. D is aggregate 
demand at retail. P0 and Q0 are the equilibrium retail price and quantity,
respectively, associated with production in old plants. P1 and Q1 are
the equilibrium retail price and quantity, respectively, associated with
production in modern plants. SRAC and SRAC' are the shortrun 
average cost curves associated with old and modern plants, 
respectively. q0 and q1 are production levels associated with the
minimum of the shortrun average cost curve for the old and modern
plants, respectively.
Source: Compiled by ERS, USDA from Barkema and Drabenstott, 1990.Production contracts also help to reduce production
uncertainties by improving technology and supervi-
sion. By providing some inputs into the production
process, the integrator has stronger incentives to super-
vise production closely, which contributes to substan-
tially lower mortality rates among contracted broilers
(Mighell and Jones). Production contracts also facili-
tate the rapid adoption of new production practices
because the integrator controls and supervises produc-
tion on a large scale (Martin). 
Vertical integration may also provide an effective
means for managing market risks. Price uncertainties
in hatching egg production contributed to integration
of the hatchery and feed stages, as feed dealers
assumed additional risk and gained greater control
over production decisions.
Unlike production contracts in the broiler industry,
most marketing contracts between large hog producers
and processors play little role in transferring price and
output risk. The packer typically provides no produc-
tion inputs, and pricing formulas are typically tied to a
market price, adjusted for quality. Only 4 of 27 large
producers surveyed in 1994 had contracts that
attempted to share or limit price risks or to link prices
to hog production costs (Hayenga and others). As sev-
eral of the large hog-producer integrators and large
packers are publicly held or diversified, they may be
proficient at managing risks.20
Financing Production Inputs
By reducing and shifting price and production risk,
contracting can increase the flow of resources into
agriculture when resource needs are significant
(Mighell and Jones). Individual producers may lack
the managerial ability to carry out investment opportu-
nities, may not wish to take a chance on losing the
equity in their farms, or may be unable to obtain credit
from traditional sources. Production contracts often
overcome these obstacles to capital investment by pro-
viding guidance and management to producers, as well
as market and price guarantees. Consequently, produc-
ers are more willing to invest their own capital and
labor. In addition, because their risks are reduced, they
are more likely to obtain loans from lenders for build-
ings, equipment, and operating expenses. By reducing
broiler production uncertainty through improved tech-
nology and supervision, feed supplier-integrators
reduced the likelihood of major production losses.
Inexperienced growers, therefore, or those with low
net worth, found it easier to obtain capital from tradi-
tional lenders for buildings and equipment (Mighell
and Jones).  
Contracting can reduce the financial burden of each
trading partner. In the broiler industry, contracting cre-
ated the impetus for growers to continue production.
Because of significant price and production risk,
broiler growers hesitated to undertake production if
they had to assemble all of the productive resources.21
Through production contracts, larger and financially
stronger feed companies reduced the growers’ capital
requirements by providing most of the variable inputs
(chicks, feed, and medicine). At the same time, pro-
duction contracts typically require the grower to make
some of the investments for producing broilers (land,
labor, facilities). As a result, the integrator’s capital
costs for plant and equipment are cut in half because
the value of investments necessary for broiler process-
ing is equivalent to the investment required for grow-
ing the birds (Westgren). This practice creates a busi-
ness arrangement with mutual interests because both
the integrator and growers have invested in specific
fixed capital.   
Costs Associated with Contracting 
and Integration
Milgrom and Roberts describe two types of transaction
costs; those related to coordination and those related to
motivation. Coordination costs include determining
details of the transaction, such as prices, making buy-
ers and sellers known to each other, and bringing buy-
ers and sellers together to transact. Examples include
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smaller growers to the large producers. Like broiler integrators,
several of the large hog producers are either publicly held or are
diversified into other commodities (for example, Tyson,
Continental Grain, Cargill, and Dekalb, recently acquired by
Monsanto), which reduces their costs of bearing risk. 
21In some cases, even when broiler producers had the resources
to produce independently, they did not wish to accept the hazards
(Mighell and Jones). costs of determining consumers’ tastes and prefer-
ences, advertising, and time spent searching for suppli-
ers offering the best prices. Motivation costs include
those associated with incomplete and asymmetric
information. These costs occur when there is insuffi-
cient information to determine whether terms of the
transaction are acceptable and whether the terms are
being met. 
While contracts may be used to reduce coordination
costs in open markets, there are motivation costs associ-
ated with contracting. Contracts are often incomplete
because individuals are subject to unobservable out-
comes or bounded rationality. Bounded rationality
refers to an individual’s limited ability to foresee all
future possibilities. Contracts that account for the full
range of contingencies are extremely expensive to write.  
Contracts between broiler growers and integrators can
create motivation costs associated with moral hazard.
Moral hazard refers to opportunistic behavior once the
contract has been entered into because actions required
under the terms of the contract are not easily observ-
able. Contracts that required the feed supplier to pro-
vide feed to the broiler grower encouraged shirking on
the part of the grower. This is because the grower did
not pay for the feed, and payments received by the
grower did not depend on the quantity of feed used or
feed efficiency. However, production contracts evolved
to lower costs of moral hazard. Incentive clauses were
later added that based the grower’s payment on feed
efficiency. Hence, the contracts controlled moral haz-
ard and, at the same time, shifted and reduced the
costs of managing price and production risk.   
Contract payment methods based on relative perfor-
mance were formulated to reduce costs of renegotiating
contract terms in response to new technology. The rapid
pace of technological advances in the broiler industry
created uncertainty regarding absolute measures of effi-
ciency that were initially specified in broiler contracts.
For example, changes in technology led to unstable feed
conversion ratios, which made constant absolute perfor-
mance measures inefficient (Martin). Because of the
integrator’s bounded rationality, it became more difficult
to update contract specifications to account for improve-
ments in technology. Contract payments based on rela-
tive performance automatically adjust to technological
gains. This is because the calculation of the bonus or
discount would not be affected by outcomes common to
all growers, such as advances in technology.22 The
reduction in the cost of revising contracts explains, in
part, why broiler production remains coordinated by
production contracts instead of vertical integration,
despite the extreme uncertainty created by rapid
changes in technology. In addition, vertical integration
could lock in employee growers, whereas contracts can
be established with growers who are best able to deal
with changing technology.  
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included a settlement cost formula that was used to measure
grower performance. An average settlement cost for flocks har-
vested at the same time was first calculated. The settlement cost
would fall as feed efficiency improves, mortality rates decline, and
bird weight increases. Relative performance was then measured as
the difference between an individual grower’s settlement cost and
the average. The base payment to the grower was adjusted up
(down) if the settlement cost was below (above) average. Current trends in food consumption include prefer-
ences for a wide variety of reliably high-quality, con-
venient food products available at reasonable prices.
These trends have been influenced by the increasing
value of households’ time, reduction in household size,
information linking diet and health, and greater ethnic
diversity (Kinsey). Demand for convenience food
products—such as take-out food, frozen entrees, and
microwavable dishes—is influenced by the high value
placed on time in our society. As the value of time
increases, opportunity costs associated with illness and
information gathering also increase. Hence, consumers
increasingly prefer quality assurances, better protec-
tion from unsafe foods, and more accurate information
about nutritional content. Health concerns also affect
food preferences, such as the current trend toward
reduced-cholesterol and reduced-fat products. 
New methods of vertical coordination that improve
financial opportunities, reduce the cost of managing
price and production risk, and lower transaction costs
can lead to increases in production efficiency, and
more convenient, higher quality meat products.
Changes in vertical coordination can facilitate the
adoption of new cost-saving technology by reducing
transaction costs and barriers to the inflow of capital.
Reductions in transaction costs associated with spe-
cific investments in breeding stock, and measuring and
sorting of live animals, may lead to more uniform,
higher quality animals. Processing costs may decline
with higher quality animals and improved scheduling
of animals for slaughter.
Figure 8 illustrates potential market effects of an
increase in the level of coordination. Changes in verti-
cal coordination can reduce farm production costs and
costs of marketing services, or marketing costs, which
include slaughtering, processing, cutting, and mer-
chandising. By facilitating the adoption of technologi-
cal advances in farm production, the farm supply curve
shifts to the right (panel a). An increase in packing
plant efficiency would lower marketing costs from
m=(Pr-Pf) to m’=(Pr’-Pf’), where m is marketing
costs, Pr is the retail price, and Pf is the farm price
(panel b). In each case, the retail supply function for
meat products shifts to the right. Improvements in the
quality and uniformity of live animals would increase
the availability of high-quality meat products, which
would shift the demand curve for meat (panel c). The
change in the retail price resulting from simultaneous
shifts in retail supply and demand depends on the size
of the horizontal shifts and the elasticities of supply
and demand. On the other hand, the equilibrium quan-
tity is unambiguously larger. In panel d, the shift in
supply from Sr to Sr’ exceeds the shift in demand,
from Dr to Dr’, so the retail meat price falls from Pr to
Pr’.23
Chicken Products
Changing methods of vertical coordination in the
broiler industry have clearly benefited consumers of
chicken products. Production contracts facilitated the
adoption of new cost-reducing technology, while 
additional production and marketing efficiencies were
obtained from vertical integration of the feed, hatchery,
processing, and breeding stages. The industry has
emphasized quality, variety, convenience, uniformity,
and affordability in its product offerings. Conse-
quently, retail chicken prices have fallen, while broiler
supplies and per capita consumption have continued to
increase. While achieving those results in the domestic
market, the broiler industry has also become a net
exporter of chicken meat. 
Retail Prices and Supplies
The broiler industry has made remarkable gains in pro-
duction and marketing efficiency. From 1975 to 1997,
commercial broiler production (ready-to-cook basis)
nearly quadrupled (fig. 9).  After adjusting for infla-
tion, consumers can now purchase whole broilers for
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coordination, transaction costs, food production costs and quality,
and supply and demand shifts can be found in Martinez, Smith,
and Zering. 
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Figure 10
Deflated retail price of chicken, pork, and beef
as a share of 1955 price
The real price of chicken is about 60 percent less than the 
price paid in 1955
Percentless than 40 percent of what they paid in 1955 (fig.
10). After World War II, the ability to offer broilers to
the emerging supermarket industry at declining nomi-
nal prices, while the price of many other food and
meat items were increasing, played an important role
in the continual growth of the broiler industry.
Additional evidence of the magnitude of production
and marketing efficiency gains is illustrated by updat-
ing simulations conducted by Lasley. The retail price
of whole broilers was simulated by holding technology
and input-output relationships constant, and varying
broiler production and marketing costs according to
changes in input prices (see Appendix). The simulated
retail price was then compared with the actual retail
price to indicate productivity gains passed on to con-
sumers (fig. 11). While the early to mid-seventies rep-
resented a period of rapidly increasing feed and energy
prices, the retail price of broilers increased at a slower
rate. If higher input prices had been passed on to con-
sumers, average retail prices would have been $1.58
per pound for broilers over the 1992-96 period, instead
of the actual average of 91 cents per pound. 
Quality and Product Form 
The U.S. broiler industry has also responded to con-
sumer preferences for a variety of convenient, value-
added products, with assurances of quality. In the mid-
1960’s, most broilers were sold as unbranded, homoge-
neous, ready-to-cook, whole birds. In response to large
supplies and volatile broiler prices, integrators focused
increasingly on product differentiation, through further
processing and brand labeling (Bugos).24 Fewer birds
are now purchased whole; consumers prefer to pur-
chase chicken based on selected parts or that are pre-
cooked. In the 1980’s, combined sales of cut-up and
further processed chicken exceeded sales of whole
birds (fig. 12). By 1995, 63 percent of broiler volume
was cut up and sold as parts, and 11 percent was sold
as further processed products, such as chicken franks,
patties, nuggets, and marinated products. 
Contracting and vertical integration have given the
integrator greater control over the volume and quality
of broilers to meet the needs of large-scale specifica-
tion buying by food-away-from-home establishments
and supermarket chains. In the 10-year period follow-
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Comparison of simulated and actual U.S. retail
chicken prices
Without the adoption of new technology, consumers would be
paying 75 percent more for chicken
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U.S. processor marketing of broilers by 
product form
The broiler industry has responded to consumer preferences
for convenient foods
Percent
Source: Compiled by ERS, USDA from National Broiler Council [a,b].
24Product differentiation gives firms the ability to compete on a
nonprice basis, so that earnings are less dependent on the volatile
nature of undifferentiated commodity markets. Purchase decisions
regarding undifferentiated products are based on prices because
consumers perceive products from competing sellers to be the
same. Firms gain some discretion over the price of their products
by differentiating their product selection, so that sales become less
sensitive to price changes.ing 1977, approximately 25,000 fast-food outlets
added chicken items to their menus (Lasley and oth-
ers). Fried chicken operators preferred small and uni-
form broilers to control portions and costs (Marion and
Arthur). The wide range of value-added chicken forms
appeals to food service operators because they can
spend more time individualizing their entrees and less
on labor-intensive preparation and assembly
(Institutional Distribution). The poultry industry leads
the other U.S. meat industries in new product develop-
ment (fig. 13). Among prepackaged, consumer-ready
meat products listed by a major supermarket chain in
1996, poultry products led all other meat categories.
Through an integrated marketing system, broiler inte-
grators also gain control over quality and uniformity
that is necessary for branded products. Branding low-
ers consumer costs of measuring products (Barzel). If
the consumer is to purchase a product without mea-
suring every item, the seller may attempt to convince
the consumer that the purchase is representative. That
is, the product is uniform and will not vary from sam-
ple to sample. Broiler integrators have standardized
production inputs and have gained a large degree of
control over the production process. Hence, they are
willing to associate their name or brand with more
uniform, high-quality products (Easterling and
Stucker). In 1988, brand names accounted for half of
all supermarket sales of chicken across the Nation,
and shoppers were willing to pay a 14-percent pre-
mium for brand-name broilers over supermarket
brands (Bugos). 
While downward shifts in retail supply appear to be
the dominant effect associated with increased vertical
coordination in the broiler industry, demand shifts are
also evident. A plot of per capita consumption of
broilers and the deflated retail price provides a rough
proxy of a demand curve (fig. 14). From 1955 to
1979, a strong negative relationship is indicated
between the price of broilers and quantity consumed.
However, the curve appears to have flattened since the
1980’s. In 1982, 47 pounds of chicken per person was
consumed at a price of 74 cents per pound. In 1989,
per capita consumption rose to 57 pounds per person,
while the price increased slightly to 75 cents per
pound. Increasing per capita consumption and little or
no change in price suggests the possibility of a shift
out in demand.25 Likely causes include higher relative
prices of substitute meats, changing consumer tastes
and preferences (for example, health concerns), and
an income effect as more affluent consumers pur-
chased premium parts and value-added products
(Rogers, 1992). 
Lower prices and response to consumer preferences
for convenient, nutritious, high-quality chicken prod-
ucts have led to continual increases in per capita
broiler consumption (fig. 15). Since 1955, per capita
consumption of broilers has increased more than five-
fold. From 1976 to 1997, per capita broiler consump-
tion nearly doubled, compared with a 5-percent
increase for pork and a 30-percent reduction for beef
(beef consumption peaked in 1976). In 1986, per
capita consumption of broilers exceeded pork for the
first time and recently surpassed beef, the leader in red
meat consumption. 
Pork Products
Industrialization in the pork industry has contributed to
productivity gains in hog production, which have
increased pork supplies and lowered pork prices. Pork
quality has also become more closely associated with
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The poultry industry has led the way in new product development
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Source: Compiled by ERS, USDA from Brester, Schroeder, and Mintert.
25A log-linear, constant elasticity relationship between price and
per capita consumption is also possible, assuming that important
factors other than price had no effect on demand.consumer preferences. The industry may realize addi-
tional economic benefits from further increases in
coordination between the production and packing
stages. An assured large, stable flow of uniform, high-
quality hogs to the packing plant can reduce pork pro-
duction costs and satisfy consumer demand for high-
quality pork products. 
Current Situation
Since 1990, pork production has increased by approxi-
mately 2 percent per year, increasing both total domes-
tic consumption (accounting for population growth)
and net trade. In the 1990’s, U.S. pork exports have
increased five-fold, and the United States has become
a net exporter of pork. To satisfy export customers,
pork companies must deliver reliable supplies of rea-
sonably priced products that are tailored to customer
specifications. Quality characteristics important to
Japan, for example, the leading importer of U.S. pork
(fig. 16), include cutting method, meat color, and lack
of PSE (Cravens).   
Despite a 1-percent annual average reduction in the
deflated retail pork price since 1990, per capita
domestic consumption (not accounting for population
growth) of pork has remained stable. Unlike demand
for broilers, the domestic demand for pork may have
shifted to the left since the 1970’s. A plot of deflated
pork prices against per capita consumption provides
evidence of a decrease in demand for pork (fig. 17).
During 1980-97, lower pork prices brought no general
increase in per capita consumption like that seen in
1955-79. For example, from 1974 to 1995 the deflated
retail pork price dropped from 219 cents per pound to
128 cents per pound, with no corresponding increase
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Figure 14
Relationship between deflated retail broiler price and quantity consumed
Additional broiler consumption at relatively stable prices after 1980 suggests a possible shift out in broiler demand
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Per capita consumption of pork, beef, and chicken
Per capita chicken consumption has increased more than
five-fold since 1955; chicken is now the leading meat consumed
in the United States
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Source:  ERS, USDA.in per capita consumption. Thurman concluded that a
significant portion of demand shifts for pork may be
due to factors other than relative meat prices and
income, such as consumers’ perception that chicken
contains less fat than red meats.26 Apparent shifts in
pork and broiler demand correspond to new informa-
tion linking diet and health. In 1977, the Senate Select
Committee on Nutrition and Human Needs defined a
set of dietary goals for the United States that helped
to stimulate a deluge of research reports.
Organizations, such as the National Research Council
and U.S. Department of Agriculture, recommend
reduced cholesterol and fat in the diet (Kinsey). In the
1980’s, the American Heart Association revised its
dietary guidelines to include less red meat consump-
tion (Thurman). 
Future Growth of the Pork Industry
Growth of chain restaurants and the continued impor-
tance of grocery store outlets provide opportunities to
cater to changing consumer preferences. Satisfying the
needs of large chain restaurants requires large, uniform
pork supplies. Introduction of bacon-topped sand-
wiches by hamburger chains, for example, created a
new outlet for millions of pounds of bacon. 
Quality assurances are also required for branded prod-
ucts at retail chains, foodservice institutions, and inter-
national markets. While most red meat is unbranded,
except for processed products like sausage, ham, and
bacon, new products, like Smithfield Foods’Lean
Generation brand of lean, fresh pork products, provide
brand name quality assurances for consumers. 
Smithfield Foods emphasizes the importance of long-
term contracts and vertical integration in obtaining a
consistent supply of high-quality hogs (Smithfield
Foods, Inc.). Smithfield Foods has long-term contracts
with affiliates of Carroll’s Foods, a major North
Carolina hog producer, to raise and purchase hogs. In
1991, this arrangement, referred to as Smithfield-
Carroll’s, acquired the exclusive franchise rights from
the National Pig Development (NPD) Company, a
British firm, to develop and market the NPD breed of
hog in the United States. This breed is said to provide
the leanest hog in U.S. commercial production and one
of the leanest meats of any kind. Nutritional studies by
the Sarah W. Stedman Center for Nutritional Studies at
Duke University Medical Center in 1996 indicated that
NPD pork was 34 percent to 61 percent leaner than
non-NPD pork, depending on the cut. Products under
the Smithfield Lean Generation label are the only pork
products that have received the American Heart
Association’s seal of approval because of the products’
superior health qualities. An NPD hog also produces
about 15 pounds of additional salable meat per hog
(Credit Suisse First Boston Corporation). 
Smithfield’s Lean Generation pork has been successful
so far. The number of NPD hogs processed by
Smithfield grew from 12,700 in 1993 (Smithfield Foods,
Inc.) to 1.6 million in 1997 (Smithfield Foods, Form
10K, filed with Securities and Exchange Commission
July 25, 1997). Through an agreement with Sumitomo
Corporation, Smithfield also provides the Japanese mar-
ket with a line of branded fresh pork products. 
While some companies have made great strides in
improving the quality of pork products, much still
needs to be done to attain consistently high-quality
pork. A 1992 survey of U.S. pork packing companies,
representing 70 percent of total slaughter, found that
quality problems cost packers $10.08 per hog due to
excess fat, PSE, and carcass defects, such as abscesses
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26Thurman found no evidence to support the assumption that
increased eating away from home decreases the own-price elastic-
ity of pork.
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Figure 16
U.S. pork exports by destination
U.S. pork exports have increased twelve-fold since 1986;
Japan is the leading importer of U.S. pork
Million poundsand bruises (table 1). For example, carcass defects and
excess fat must be removed, which results in less sal-
able meat. PSE problems cause pork cuts best suited
for fresh pork to be used in further processed pork. 
Increasing coordination between packers and produc-
ers to improve pork quality may yield packer cost sav-
ings and larger quantities of consistent, high-quality
pork products. Of the total packer costs related to qual-
ity problems, $8.15 (80 percent of total problem cost)
was controllable by actions at the farm level. By
reducing improper injections of medication and rough
handling of hogs, which cause abscesses and bruising,
farmers can lower packer costs related to carcass
defects. Leanness problems and PSE problems can be
controlled by farmers through improved genetics.
Availability of higher quality pork might also increase
pork demand, by giving consumers a lean, yet palat-
able, pork product with a more attractive appearance. 
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Table 1—Packer costs associated with quality problems
Packer defect Cost controlled 
Cost by farmer
$/head Percent $/head
I
Leanness problems:
  Backfat thickness 2.80 100 2.80
  Degree of ham and butt trimming 1.87 100 1.87
  Excessive seam fat .63 100 .63
  Bellies too fat or too thin .14 100 .14
  Weight problems .88 100 .88
Carcass problems:
  Carcass condemnations 1.00 75 .75
  Abscesses .47 100 .47
  Bruises .08 75 .06
  Skin problems .01 75
  Arthritis .08 100 .08
  Other 1.29 0
PSE/color problems:
  Color .27 75 .20
  Pale, soft, watery .34 75 .25
  Dark, firm, dry .01 75
Total packer costs 10.08 8.15
ICalculated by multiplying cost per head and percent of cost 
controlled by farmer.
Source: National Pork Producers Council, 1994. 
 .0075
.0075
0Perfectly competitive markets provide an ideal stan-
dard against which one can compare actual market
behavior. The theory underlying perfect competition
assumes that there is a large number of independent
producers and consumers (so that no individual can
influence prices), firms can freely enter and exit the
industry, and producers and consumers have perfect
information about prices and the quality of goods. In a
perfectly competitive market, entrepreneurial actions
of independent sellers and buyers will yield an equilib-
rium price and quantity that maximizes aggregate eco-
nomic welfare of producers and consumers. 
Firms with market power can influence prices to their
benefit, so that prices and resource allocations are no
longer representative of a competitive equilibrium.27
When market prices do not convey proper signals, pro-
ducers and consumers are not able to make profit-max-
imizing or utility-maximizing decisions.  
Firms may vertically integrate to enhance market power
by limiting entry into existing markets or by expanding
their influence.28 According to Mighell and Jones, large
horizontal size serves as the original means for market
power, which can then be enhanced by vertical integra-
tion. Firms may continue to grow beyond what is
needed to capture scale economies, to increase their
influence on adjoining stages. Some firms may try to
limit competition by excluding competitors from cer-
tain areas or by reducing available markets. Firms can
achieve similar market power-enhancing results with
less capital investment through use of contracts, even
though contracts are specified for only a limited time. 
As open market coordination is replaced by contracts
or vertical integration, market prices may become less
representative of competitive equilibrium supply and
demand conditions because they are based on fewer
purchases and sales. They may also become highly
volatile and subject to manipulation. These markets
are commonly referred to as thin markets. Price 
signals in thin markets may lead to misallocated
resources and lower social welfare relative to the 
standard of perfect competition.  
Concerns about market power stemming from the rapid
structural changes in the pork and other red meat indus-
tries prompted funding for a USDA study on concentra-
tion in the red meat industries. The study found a con-
tinual need to monitor and analyze structural change in
the industries (USDA[i]). A USDA advisory committee,
formed later to analyze the concentration study and
other relevant studies (USDA[h]), suggested that the
public role may be one of ensuring that negotiating par-
ties are well informed of market conditions, and estab-
lishing penalties for exploitative behavior. In 1997,
USDA expressed its intent to strengthen fair trade prac-
tices, including an investigation of pricing and procure-
ment methods, procurement areas, and contractual
agreements by several major hog slaughter plants.29
Contracting arrangements between hog producers and
packers have been an area of focus because of the sub-
stantial increases in these arrangements. Smaller inde-
pendent hog producers complain they cannot compete
when large packers contract only with large producers
and do not make public the premiums they pay. In addi-
tion, an increasing share of hogs is being sold through
marketing contracts that include formula pricing. For
example, marketing contracts between producers and
packers in North Carolina include a formula for pricing
the hogs based on the Midwest quoted price adjusted for
quality premiums or discounts. With fewer sales based
on negotiated prices by large numbers of buyers and
28 v Vertical Coordination in the Pork and Broiler Industries Economic Research Service/USDA
Policy Responses to New Methods of 
Vertical Coordination
27“Market power” refers to the ability of firms to influence price
and other terms of trade. 
28A recent example is Tyson’s acquisition of the Cobb Company
to prevent competitors from monopolizing the Cobb 500 strain of
birds (Bugos).
29USDA is also examining potential anticompetitive practices in
poultry procurement, including the effects of production contracts
on broiler growers.sellers (thin markets), the prices may become less repre-
sentative of a competitive market equilibrium. 
The commercial broiler industry faced changes in ver-
tical coordination years ago. Yet, the industry has been
relatively free of government intervention. Before
1961, government’s role in the broiler business was
that of “helpful, but benign, mentor and aid to the
industry” (Tobin and Arthur, p. 83). By 1961, there
was increased interest by policymakers in dealing with
problems faced by producers, namely broiler price
depressions and market volatility. There were failed
attempts by the Kennedy Administration, for example,
to support prices and regulate production to “stabilize”
the industry. There appears to have been less concern
about the nature of competition.30 Any market advan-
tage potential in the broiler industry may have been
disguised by the rapid changes that occurred. More
significant factors may have been new technology,
rapid growth in production, and expanded market
demand (Mighell and Jones). In addition, the broiler
industry has been one of the least concentrated indus-
tries in the food system (Rogers, 1992).31 Moreover,
there had never been a large core of independent
broiler producers, as in the pork industry, so price dis-
crimination and a decline in the number of market out-
lets were less important issues.  
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30Potential problems associated with contracting and vertically
integrated structures were certainly recognized. In a 1966 report by
the National Commission on Food Marketing (NCFM), issues
were summarized regarding the accuracy and representativeness of
the base used in formula pricing arrangements between buyers and
sellers, and the quality of market information. In addition, the
National Broiler Marketing Association, which was a cooperative
formed by broiler integrators in 1970 to promote market stability,
was found to be in violation of antitrust regulations and was later
disbanded as an illegal conspiracy (Alden Manchester, ERS, con-
tributed this point). 
31Economic theory suggests that in markets characterized by
imperfect competition (monopoly, monopsony, oligopoly), firms
may contract or vertically integrate to increase profits. In most
cases considered by Royer, however, vertical integration increased
output, lowered consumer prices, and increased social welfare.The U.S. broiler industry provides an excellent demon-
stration of the importance of vertical coordination on
food system performance. While several possible
motives exist for contracting and vertical integration,
these methods of coordination clearly facilitated sub-
stantial reductions in the retail price of broilers (table
2). Although technological advances in the 1940’s and
1950’s set the stage for growth and development of the
broiler industry, the manner in which the industry was
organized prevented its making best use of this tech-
nology. New methods of organizing broiler production
facilitated the rapid and thorough adoption of new
cost-lowering production technology. Contracts
between the broiler growers and feed company-inte-
grators became a means of quickly harnessing new
technology by reducing capital constraints. 
By facilitating adoption of new technology, improving
risk management, and stabilizing flows of uniform
broiler supplies into processing plants, these arrange-
ments provided the means for lowering production
costs, increasing production, lowering retail prices, and
controlling quality. Following World War II, while
broiler production and consumption expanded at a
rapid pace, supplies and prices were highly variable.
Production contracts between broiler growers and inte-
grators improved production practices and transferred
price and production risk to the integrators, who could
manage the risk more cheaply. Vertical integration of
the feed, hatchery, and processing stages enabled firms
to maintain large volumes and control the flow of
broilers at each stage to capture economies of scale.
Contracting and vertical integration, from breeding to
processing, also enabled broiler integrators to stan-
dardize production inputs and gain a large degree of
control over the production process. That control has
enabled the industry to provide uniform, high-quality
broilers for further processing and branding.  
Rapid changes in methods of vertical coordination in
the pork industry are also associated with new technol-
ogy, substantial growth in new geographical areas of
production, and scale economies. The motives for
changing to new methods of vertical coordination
seem to be similar in both industries. Contractual
agreements and vertical integration are associated with
specific assets, quality control, and assurances of sta-
ble input flows and market outlets. By reducing the
likelihood of opportunistic behavior associated with
specific assets, larger investments may be made in
cost-reducing and quality-improving technology.
Contracting and integration may also facilitate
30 v Vertical Coordination in the Pork and Broiler Industries Economic Research Service/USDA
Summary and Conclusions
Table 2—Implications of changing methods of vertical coordination for meat products
Incentive Outcome Effect on meat products
Capital inflow from financially  Facilitate adoption of new Lower production costs, larger 
stronger firms  technology supplies, lower prices, improved quality
Shift risk-management  Lower costs of managing price Larger supplies, lower prices
responsibilities to more capable,   and production risks
technically proficient  firms
Lower measuring and  Improved animal quality and Lower production costs, improved 
sorting costs  uniformity  quality, convenience
Assure input supplies and More stable input flows and  Lower procurement and processing 
market outlets  lower production risk  costs, larger supplies, lower prices
Gain market power   Increased profits Ambiguousimprovements in meat quality by lowering measuring
and sorting costs to assure high-quality animals. With
large, stable flows of uniform animal supplies, pro-
cessing plants can operate near optimum capacity,
thereby keeping processing costs low.
While recent developments in the pork industry have
increased pork supplies, lowered retail pork prices, and
improved pork quality, the need to further improve the
quality and consistency of pork products may acceler-
ate the use of contractual arrangements and vertical
integration. New entrants into packing in the 1990’s
have included a number of single-plant firms, empha-
sizing value-added, differentiated pork products in
order to compete with the higher volume, lower cost,
multi-plant firms (Boehlje and others). Firms such as
Premium Standard Farms (PSF) and Seaboard Corp.
stress highly coordinated raw material flows and close
alliances with their customers. 
Throughout the development of the broiler industry,
the government’s approach was basically laissez-
faire. While concerns were raised about price dis-
crimination and thin markets associated with
increases in contracting and vertical integration, few
instances of antitrust prosecution occurred, and no
restrictions were placed on new methods of coordina-
tion. When open markets fail to satisfy the ideals of
perfectly competitive markets, firms may seek alter-
natives to open market coordination. For example, in
the early years of broiler industry development, large
capital requirements provided significant barriers for
broiler growers. Contractual arrangements with feed
dealers reduced the growers’ financial burden and
facilitated the adoption of new cost-saving technol-
ogy. As the marketing system adjusted to coordinate
production with consumer demand, consumers were
the major beneficiaries. 
Economic incentives for new methods of coordination,
and possible benefits to consumers, should also be con-
sidered when addressing issues of market power and
environmental degradation related to large hog and
packing operations. Public policies that limit structural
changes in the pork industry may reduce benefits related
to size economies and increased vertical coordination.
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Simulated retail chicken prices were calculated by summing the simulated farm value of broilers (ready-to-cook
basis (RTC)) in year j (FVj) and simulated broiler marketing costs in year j (MCj). Farm value in each year was
simulated by using price indices for production inputs to adjust feed cost, nonfeed cost, and returns to producers in
1960, and then summing across inputs:1
where FEED is the feed cost per pound of broilers in 1960 (10.3 cents per pound), FPIj is the broiler feed price
index in year j, NONFEED is the nonfeed production costs in 1960 (5.4 cents per pound), PPIj is the producer price
index for finished goods in year j, RETURNS are the returns to producers above production costs in 1960 (1.1
cents per pound), and CPIj is the consumer price index in year j. Returns were multiplied by the Consumer Price
Index to calculate the returns in year j that would have provided the same real return as 1.1 cents in 1960. Live
weight farm value was then divided by 0.72 to convert to RTC basis. Similarly, marketing costs were simulated by
multiplying broiler marketing costs in 1960 by the appropriate price indices, and summing:
where LABOR is the broiler labor marketing cost in 1960 (8.1 cents per pound), EARNj is the index of average
hourly earnings of production workers in the food and kindred products industries in year j, ENERGY is energy
cost in 1960 (1.6 cents per pound), FUELj is the index for fuels, power, and related products, PACK is the packag-
ing and materials cost in 1960 (1.6 cents per pound), CONTAINj is the index of prices for containers in year j, and
OVERHD are overhead and other costs in 1960 (7.7 cents per pound). 
36 v Vertical Coordination in the Pork and Broiler Industries Economic Research Service/USDA
j
j
1960
j
1960
j
1960
FV FEED
FPI
FPI
NONFEED
PPI
PPI
RETURNS
CPI
CPI
=
æ
è
ç
ö
ø
÷ +
æ
è
ç
ö
ø
÷ +
æ
è
ç
ö
ø
÷
j
j
1960
j
1960
j
1960
j
1960
MC LABOR
EARN
EARN
ENERGY
FUEL
FUEL
PACK
CONTAIN
CONTAIN
OVERHD
PPI
PPI
=
æ
è
ç
ö
ø
÷ +
æ
è
ç
ö
ø
÷ +
æ
è
ç
ö
ø
÷ +
æ
è
ç
ö
ø
÷
(1)
(2)
.72
1According to Lasley, benchmark data were available for this year and prices were relatively stable, even though major industry changes
had already begun.
AppendixEconomic Research Service/USDA Vertical Coordination in the Pork and Broiler Industries v 37
Appendix table 1—Consumer price indices and indices for production inputs
Marketing cost indices
4
Year CPI food 
1 Broiler rations 
2 PPI  finished  Labor---Hourly   Fuel and power Packaging 
goods 
3  earnings and benefits  and containers
1982-84=100 1980=100 1982=100 1967=100
1960 29.6 44.6 33.4 79.9 96.1 95.5
1961 29.9 45.0 33.4 82.2 97.1 94.7
1962 30.2 45.1 33.5 84.7 96.6 95.9
1963 30.6 44.1 33.4 87.1 96.3 94.7
1964 31.0 44.0 33.5 89.8 93.7 94.0
1965 31.5 44.1 34.1 91.9 95.5 95.8
1966 32.4 45.6 35.2 95.4 97.8 98.4
1967 33.4 45.0 35.6 100.0 100.0 100.0
1968 34.8 42.9 36.6 106.5 99.7 96.3
1969 36.7 43.6 38.0 113.7 100.5 99.5
1970 38.8 46.1 39.3 122.5 106.1 103.6
1971 40.5 47.3 40.5 131.9 112.3 106.6
1972 41.8 47.5 41.8 143.3 118.4 110.4
1973 44.4 73.4 45.6 154.2 133.1 117.3
1974 49.3 81.6 52.5 168.7 198.9 149.7
1975 53.8 79.1 58.2 187.4 236.1 174.4
1976 56.9 81.4 60.8 203.8 264.5 184.8
1977 60.6 82.6 64.7 222.4 310.6 192.8
1978 65.2 81.7 69.8 244.4 331.7 204.7
1979 72.6 91.5 77.6 265.8 418.2 228.4
1980 82.4 100.0 88.0 292.6 563.2 261.5
1981 90.9 109.9 96.1 321.3 669.2 280.9
1982 96.5 101.6 100.0 342.7 705.1 275.1
1983 99.6 107.7 101.6 356.8 705.1 280.7
1984 103.9 112.8 103.7 365.5 712.5 303.5
1985 107.6 95.2 104.6 363.0 700.0 312.1
1986 109.6 90.5 103.2 359.4 590.2 317.4
1987 113.6 89.7 105.2 361.2 596.7 329.8
1988 118.3 96.1 108.0 370.5 578.2 350.7
1989 124.0 97.5 113.6 382.2 619.4 364.6
1990 130.7 87.7 119.2 395.7 671.4 367.6
1991 136.2 87.7 121.7 405.8 655.7 371.2
1992 140.3 88.0 123.2 418.4 654.6 370.1
1993 144.5 88.5 124.7 432.1 671.7 371.1
1994 148.2 92.2 125.5 443.6 660.7 385.3
1995 152.4 91.5 127.9 455.2 633.7 415.7
1996 156.9 118.1 131.3 459.7 670.7 399.8
1Source: U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics.
2Source: Lasley and others and U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics.
3Source: U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics. 
4Source: Elitzak; Lasley.38 v Vertical Coordination in the Pork and Broiler Industries Economic Research Service/USDA
Appendix table 2—Simulated costs of producing live broilers
Year Farm value
Feed Nonfeed Returns Liveweight Ready-to-cook
Cents/pound
1960 10.3 5.4 1.1 16.8 23.3
1961 10.4 5.4 1.1 16.9 23.5
1962 10.4 5.4 1.1 17.0 23.5
1963 10.2 5.4 1.1 16.7 23.2
1964 10.2 5.4 1.2 16.7 23.2
1965 10.2 5.5 1.2 16.9 23.4
1966 10.5 5.7 1.2 17.4 24.2
1967 10.4 5.8 1.2 17.4 24.1
1968 9.9 5.9 1.3 17.1 23.8
1969 10.1 6.1 1.4 17.6 24.4
1970 10.6 6.4 1.4 18.4 25.6
1971 10.9 6.6 1.5 19.0 26.3
1972 11.0 6.8 1.6 19.3 26.8
1973 16.9 7.4 1.7 26.0 36.1
1974 18.8 8.5 1.8 29.2 40.5
1975 18.3 9.4 2.0 29.7 41.2
1976 18.8 9.8 2.1 30.7 42.7
1977 19.1 10.5 2.3 31.8 44.1
1978 18.9 11.3 2.4 32.6 45.2
1979 21.1 12.5 2.7 36.4 50.5
1980 23.1 14.2 3.1 40.4 56.1
1981 25.4 15.5 3.4 44.3 61.5
1982 23.4 16.2 3.6 43.2 60.0
1983 24.9 16.4 3.7 45.0 62.5
1984 26.0 16.8 3.9 46.7 64.8
1985 22.0 16.9 4.0 42.9 59.6
1986 20.9 16.7 4.1 41.6 57.8
1987 20.7 17.0 4.2 41.9 58.3
1988 22.2 17.5 4.4 44.0 61.2
1989 22.5 18.4 4.6 45.5 63.2
1990 20.2 19.3 4.9 44.4 61.6
1991 20.2 19.7 5.1 45.0 62.5
1992 20.3 19.9 5.2 45.5 63.1
1993 20.4 20.2 5.4 46.0 63.8
1994 21.3 20.3 5.5 47.1 65.4
1995 21.1 20.7 5.7 47.5 65.9
1996 27.3 21.2 5.8 54.3 75.5
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Appendix table 3—Simulated marketing costs and retail prices 
Year Marketing costs
1
Packaging and  Overhead  Total marketing Simulated Actual retail
Labor Energy material and other  costs retail price
1 price
2
Cents/pound
1960 8.1 1.6 1.6 7.7 19.0 42.3 42.4
1961 8.3 1.6 1.6 7.7 19.2 42.7 38.3
1962 8.6 1.6 1.6 7.7 19.5 43.1 40.5
1963 8.8 1.6 1.6 7.7 19.7 42.9 40.8
1964 9.1 1.6 1.6 7.7 20.0 43.2 38.6
1965 9.3 1.6 1.6 7.9 20.4 43.8 39.6
1966 9.7 1.6 1.6 8.1 21.1 45.3 41.6
1967 10.1 1.7 1.7 8.2 21.7 45.8 38.7
1968 10.8 1.7 1.6 8.4 22.5 46.3 40.8
1969 11.5 1.7 1.7 8.8 23.6 48.1 43.4
1970 12.4 1.8 1.7 9.1 25.0 50.6 41.7
1971 13.4 1.9 1.8 9.3 26.4 52.7 42.0
1972 14.5 2.0 1.8 9.6 28.0 54.8 42.7
1973 15.6 2.2 2.0 10.5 30.3 66.4 60.8
1974 17.1 3.3 2.5 12.1 35.1 75.6 57.0
1975 19.0 3.9 2.9 13.4 39.3 80.5 64.3
1976 20.7 4.4 3.1 14.0 42.2 84.9 61.2
1977 22.6 5.2 3.2 14.9 45.9 90.0 61.9
1978 24.8 5.5 3.4 16.1 49.8 95.1 66.5
1979 27.0 7.0 3.8 17.9 55.6 106.2 67.7
1980 29.7 9.4 4.4 20.3 63.7 119.8 71.9
1981 32.6 11.1 4.7 22.2 70.6 132.1 73.7
1982 34.8 11.7 4.6 23.1 74.2 134.2 71.6
1983 36.2 11.7 4.7 23.4 76.1 138.6 72.8
1984 37.1 11.9 5.1 23.9 77.9 142.8 81.4
1985 36.8 11.7 5.2 24.1 77.8 137.4 76.3
1986 36.4 9.8 5.3 23.8 75.4 133.2 83.5
1987 36.6 9.9 5.5 24.3 76.4 134.6 78.5
1988 37.6 9.6 5.9 24.9 78.0 139.2 85.4
1989 38.8 10.3 6.1 26.2 81.4 144.6 92.7
1990 40.1 11.2 6.2 27.5 85.0 146.6 89.9
1991 41.2 10.9 6.2 28.1 86.4 148.9 88.1
1992 42.4 10.9 6.2 28.4 88.0 151.1 86.9
1993 43.8 11.2 6.2 28.8 90.0 153.8 89.0
1994 45.0 11.0 6.5 28.9 91.4 156.8 90.1
1995 46.2 10.6 7.0 29.5 93.2 159.1 91.7
1996 46.6 11.2 6.7 30.3 94.8 170.2 97.3
1Source: ERS/USDA.
2Source: Lasley and others and USDA[c].